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Abstract
Past estimates of the effect of family income on child development have often been plagued
by endogeneity and measurement error. In this paper, we use an instrumental variables strategy
to estimate the causal effect of income on children’s math and reading achievement. Our iden-
tification derives from the large, non-linear changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
over the last two decades. The largest of these changes increased family income by as much
as 20%, or approximately $2,100, between 1993 and 1997. Using a panel of roughly 4,500 chil-
dren matched to their mothers from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth datasets allows us
to address problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous transitory income
shocks, and measurement error in income. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase
in income raises combined math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation in the
short-run. Test gains are larger for children from disadvantaged families and are robust to a
variety of alternative specifications.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, 13.2 million children in the U.S. under the age of 18, or more than one in six children, were
living in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Given such a high poverty rate, the consequences
of growing up poor on child well-being and future success has emerged as an important research
topic. Of particular interest is whether income support programs like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) can improve child development. However, the extent to which income maintenance
programs, and family income more generally, impact children is not easily estimated.
The major challenge faced by researchers attempting to estimate the causal effect of family
income on children’s outcomes has been the endogeneity of income. Children growing up in poor
families are likely to have adverse home environments or face other challenges which would continue
to affect their development even if family income were to increase substantially. Furthermore, year-
to-year changes in family circumstances like parental job loss or promotion, illness, or moving
to a new neighborhood may affect both family income as well as family dynamics and parenting
behavior. The latter poses a problem for traditional empirical studies that fail to separately identify
the effects caused by changes in income from the effects of changes in other unmeasured family
circumstances. These concerns have long prevented the literature from reaching a consensus on
whether family income has a causal effect on child development (see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
(1997), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Mayer (1997)).
Since the mid-1990s, one of the largest federal anti-poverty programs in the U.S. has been the
EITC, which provides cash assistance to low-income families and individuals who have earnings
from work.1 Low income families with two or more children can receive a credit of up to 40% of
their income in recent years (up to $4,824 in 2008), while families with one child can receive a credit
of up to 34%. In 2007, the EITC provided $48.7 billion in income benefits to 25 million families
and individuals, lifting more children out of poverty than any other government program (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). It is natural to ask what effect the EITC and other income
maintenance programs have on disadvantaged children.
Expansions of the EITC in the late 1980s and 1990s provide an exogenous source of income
variation for American families that we use to identify the effects of family income on child achieve-
ment. Figure 1 shows that EITC expansions over this period were sizeable and primarily benefitted
low to middle income families. Not only did the maximum benefit amount increase substantially,
1See Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for detailed descriptions of the EITC program and a
summary of related research.
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but the range of family income which qualified families for EITC benefits also expanded. The figure
shows that two-child families with pre-tax incomes ranging from $12,000-16,000 would have seen
their EITC payments increase by as much as $900 from 1987 to 1993 and another $2,100 between
1993 and 1997.2 The maximum subsidy rate for low income families with two children doubled
from 19.5% to 40% of earned income over the latter period.3
We estimate the impact of changes in family income (resulting from the EITC expansions) on
child cognitive achievement. Our estimation strategy is based on the fact that low to middle income
families benefitted substantially from expansions of the EITC in the late-1980s and mid-1990s while
higher income families did not. To the extent that income affects child achievement, we should
observe relative improvements in the test scores of children from families benefitting the most from
the EITC expansions.
Our analysis uses panel data on almost 4,500 children matched to their mothers in the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). These data contain a rich set of income
and demographic measures. More importantly, these data have up to five repeated measures of
cognitive test scores per child taken every other year, which allows us to account for unobserved
child fixed effects.
Our instrumental variables estimates suggest that current income has a significant effect on a
child’s math and reading achievement — a $1,000 increase in family income raises math and reading
test scores by about 6% of a standard deviation. The estimated effects are larger for children from
more disadvantaged backgrounds, for younger children, and for boys. Simple dynamic models
suggest that contemporaneous income has the largest effect on achievement, with small effects
from past income.
While modest, our instrumental variables estimates are larger than cross-section ordinary least
squares (OLS) or standard fixed effects (FE) estimates. Several explanations may account for this
difference. One is that income is noisily measured, so that OLS and FE estimates suffer from
attenuation bias. It is also possible that income matters more for the most disadvantaged and that
our instrument largely reflects the effect of income for these families. Perhaps the most interesting
2All dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers
(CPI-U) to adjust for inflation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to adjust maximum credit amounts and phase-
in/phase-out regions for cost-of-living changes in years that did not specifically legislate changes in the EITC schedule.
However, the federal tax adjustment is based on the CPI from the previous year (rather than the current year as
used in our calculations). This explains why the reported maximum credit in our figures is about $30 less in 1989
than it was in 1987.
3Expansions for single-child families were quite similar to those for two-child families prior to 1993; however, they
have been more modest since. While their phase-in subsidy rate nearly doubled from 18.5% to 34% between 1993
and 1997, their maximum credit amount ‘only’ increased by about 50%. Only 10% of the observations used in our
analysis are from single-child families.
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explanation is that expectations about future income play an important role in determining child
outcomes. In this case, permanent changes in family income should have larger effects on children
than do temporary changes. To the extent that changes in the EITC are expected to last longer
than most idiosyncratic shocks to family income, our instrumental variables estimates should be
greater than traditional OLS and fixed effect estimates (see Dahl and Lochner (2005)).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a brief literature review. Section 3
discusses our strategy for estimating the effect of family income on child outcomes. We then discuss
the data and document the large changes in the EITC in Section 4. Section 5 presents estimates of
the effect of income on math and reading test scores, including results from a variety of alternative
specifications and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Research
A growing empirical literature questions how poverty affects a child’s well-being and whether income
support programs can improve a child’s life chances. However, evidence on the extent to which
family income affects child development is mixed. Previous studies differ in data, methods, and
findings, as discussed in the collection of studies in Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) or the surveys
in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Mayer (1997).
Researchers have provided several explanations for why family income might affect child devel-
opment. First, poverty is associated with increased levels of parental stress, depression, and poor
health — conditions which might adversely affect parents’ ability to nurture their children (see,
e.g., McLoyd 1990). For example, in 1998, 27% of kindergartners living in poverty had a parent
at risk for depression, compared to 14% for other kindergartners (Child Trends and Center for
Child Health Research, 2004). Low income parents also report a higher level of frustration and
aggravation with their children, and these children are more likely to have poor verbal development
and exhibit higher levels of distractability and hostility in the classroom (Parker et. al, 1999).
Two recent working papers examine income transfer programs in Canada and the U.S. and find
evidence that income transfers improve a family’s emotional well-being. Milligan and Stabile (2009)
find significant positive effects on self-reported child and maternal mental health, and Evans and
Garthwaite (2010) find lower levels of self-reported maternal stress and a drop in the probability of
risky levels of biomarkers associated with stress. Extra family income might also matter if parents
use the money for child-centered goods like books, for quality daycare or preschool programs, for
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better dependent health care, or to move to a better neighborhood.4
Until very recently, empirical studies linking poverty and income to child outcomes have done
little to eliminate biases caused by the omission of unobserved family and child characteristics. Most
studies employ regressions of an outcome variable (such as scholastic achievement) on some measure
of family income and a set of observable family, child, and neighborhood characteristics. While these
studies reveal the correlations between income and child outcomes, they do not necessarily estimate
a causal relationship as Mayer (1997), Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), and others have pointed
out. Children living in poor families may have a worse home environment or other characteristics
that the researcher does not observe. These omitted variables may be part of the reason for
substandard achievement and may continue to affect children’s development even if family income
were to rise.
Blau (1999), Duncan, et. al (1998), and Levy and Duncan (1999) use fixed effects estimation
strategies to eliminate biases caused by permanent family or child characteristics. All three studies
use differences in family income levels across siblings to remove fixed family factors when estimating
the impacts of income on child outcomes. Using PSID data, both Duncan, et. al (1998) and Levy and
Duncan (1999) find that family income at early ages is more important for determining educational
attainment whether they control for fixed family effects or not. Using data from the Children
of the NLSY, Blau (1999) reaches somewhat different conclusions. He estimates larger effects of
“permanent income” when he controls for “grandparent fixed effects” (i.e. comparing outcomes for
the children of sisters) than when he does not. However, he finds smaller and insignificant effects of
current family income on achievement and behavioral outcomes when he uses fixed effect strategies
(regardless of whether he uses comparisons of cousins, siblings, or repeated observations for the
same individual) rather than OLS. While these studies represent a significant step forward, they
do not control for endogenous transitory shocks (e.g. parental job loss or promotion, family illness,
residential moves) and likely suffer from severe attenuation bias, since growth in income is typically
noisily measured.5
A few recent studies attempt to address these problems in a variety of ways. Two quasi-
4Low income parents have fewer children’s books in their homes and spend less time reading to their children,
markers which are negatively associated with future academic performance. Children in poor families are also less
likely to receive adequate health care and nutrition, both of which might affect performance in school. Finally,
neighborhood poverty has been associated with underfunded public schools and lower achievement scores among
young children (Child Trends and Center for Child Health Research, 2004).
5Taking a slightly different approach, Carniero and Heckman (2002) estimate the effects of income at different
child ages on subsequent college enrollment, controlling for the present discounted value of family income (a measure
of “permanent income”) and math test scores at age twelve. While they estimate significant effects of “permanent
income”, the estimated effects of income at early childhood ages and at later childhood ages are insignificant.
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experimental studies estimate the impacts of government income transfers on children. Duncan,
Morris and Rodrigues (2007) combine data from ten welfare and anti-poverty experiments in an
attempt to identify the effect of family income separately from employment and welfare effects
induced by the programs. Milligan and Stabile (2009) estimate the impacts of changes in child
tax benefits in Canada on child outcomes using variation in benefit changes by province and the
number of children in the household. These studies find modest to large effects of family income
on child educational and achievement outcomes that are largely consistent with our estimates. A
second set of studies (Løken 2010, Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2010) estimates the impact of
family income on the educational attainment and IQ of Norwegian children using regional variation
in the economic boom following the discovery of oil as an instrument for income. Generalizing
the specification of Løken (2010), Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) estimate that income has
sizeable impacts on education and IQ among children from low-income families; however, those
effects decline sharply among higher income families.6
The conclusions reached by recent studies suggest that unobserved heterogeneity and endoge-
nous income shocks are important concerns. Furthermore, they suggest that income effects may
be greatest among economically disadvantaged families. In the following section, we outline an
instrumental variables strategy which eliminates omitted variable biases due to both permanent
and temporary shocks correlated with family income and alleviates bias due to measurement error
in income. Given our source of exogenous income variation (changes in the EITC), our strategy
identifies the effects of family income on achievement for children from lower-income families.
Using our instrumental variables approach, we explore a few simple dynamic specifications
of child achievement that allow for lasting effects of family income on children. Few previous
studies explore dynamic relationships between family income and child achievement. Those that
do tend to focus on the relative importance of family income received at different child ages and
are subject to the same concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous family income
shocks as described above. Most of these studies find that income received when a child is young
has stronger lasting impacts than does income received during later childhood or adolescence (see
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997 and Duncan et al. 1998).7
6Other evidence from recent studies on the effects of parental education and job displacement indirectly suggests
that family income may have important effects on children. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) estimate that
increases in maternal (but not paternal) education led to increases in schooling attainment among Norwegian boys.
Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2006) estimate that an additional year of parental education reduces the probability
an American child repeats a grade in school by 2 to 4 percentage points. Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2008)
estimate that a father’s job displacement reduces family income in Canada by about 12% for up to 8 years and
reduces future earnings of the son by about 9%.
7Related studies estimate dynamic models of child development as a function of family and school inputs; however,
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3 Methodology
3.1 Modeling Child Achievement
Child achievement potentially depends on a child’s ability, as well as other past and present child
inputs (e.g. parental time, books, neighborhoods, schools, and home environments).8 Since family
income affects decisions about investment in children, as well as parental stress and whether the
general home environment is conducive to development, current and lagged family income have the
potential to affect child outcomes at any particular age. In this section, we model how changes in
family income (through such policies as the EITC) affect child achievement.
Let xi reflect observable permanent characteristics and µi reflect unobserved permanent ‘ability’
for child i (i.e., a child fixed effect). These measures can also incorporate unobserved long-run
differences across families. Let wia reflect time-varying characteristics and Iia total family income
(net of any taxes and transfers, including EITC payments) for child i at age a. Finally, let εia
denote any time-varying unobserved shocks to the child or family. Using this notation, a general
model for child outcome yia as a function of the child’s family characteristics and income history is
yia = fa(xi, wi0, ..., wia, Ii0, ..., Iia, µi, εia). For empirical purposes, it is useful to simplify the child
outcome equation as follows:
yia = x′iαa + w
′
iaβ + Iiaδ0 + Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+ Ii,a−LδL + µi + εia, (1)
assuming that the effects of income on child achievement last for L years.9
To focus on the role of income, equation (1) abstracts from the effects of past time-varying
characteristics; however, these can easily be incorporated in the same way as past income. Equation
(1) also abstracts from the possibility that income has different effects at different ages (i.e. effects
depend only on the time elapsed between when income is earned and when child achievement is
measured) or at different points in the income distribution (i.e. linearity in income is assumed).
We explore these issues empirically below.
they do not directly measure the effects of family income on children. For example, Todd and Wolpin (2007) estimate
a dynamic model of both family and school inputs into child development. Their estimates imply strong lasting
effects of family inputs (e.g. number of books in the home) but relatively weak effects of measured school inputs (e.g.
teacher salary). Building on the ‘value added’ literature aimed at estimating the effectiveness of individual teachers,
a number of recent studies find that teacher-induced gains in student test scores are sizeable in the short-run, but
they tend to fade out very quickly (Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
8See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for a clear exposition of the issues involved in identifying and estimating child
achievement production functions.
9One commonly used achievement model assumes that current achievement depends on current income and lagged
achievement (e.g. yia = x
′
iαa + wiaβ + Iiaδ + yi,a−1ρ + µi + εia). Recursively substituting in for lagged values of
achievement on the right hand side yields a specification very similar to equation (1) in which all lagged income
measures and other time varying characteristics would also be included.
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The specification in equation (1) allows for different effects of permanent characteristics at all
ages (i.e. αa). In our empirical analysis, we allow xi characteristics (e.g. race, gender, and age of the
child) to affect both the level and growth of child achievement. Taking first-differences of equation
(1) to eliminate the unobserved fixed effect µi yields:
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +∆Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+∆Ii,a−LδL +∆εia, (2)
where α ≡ αa − αa−1 is the effect of xi on achievement growth (assumed to be age invariant).
A common achievement specification in the child development literature assumes that there are
only contemporaneous effects of family income on children, ignoring any long-run effects. That is,
L = 0 in equations (1) and (2), which yields the following estimating equation in first-differences:
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +∆εia. (3)
This ‘contemporaneous effects’ model serves as our baseline and receives empirical support in our
analysis. It is difficult empirically to estimate more general models which allow prior income in
every year since birth to affect child outcomes. However, we also estimate specifications which
allow one and two year lags.
3.2 Using Changes in the EITC to Estimate the Effects of Income
The primary concern with least squares estimation of the models above is the possibility that
changes in unobserved factors affecting child development (i.e. ∆εia) are correlated with changes
in family income. More generally, ∆εia may be correlated with the entire history of income levels
given the strong intertemporal correlation of income and its tendency for regression to the mean.
To address this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy that takes
advantage of major changes in the EITC to estimate the effects of income on children. To simplify
the discussion, we focus on the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model of equation (3); however, we take
a similar approach in estimating the more general model implied by equation (2), which allows for
lasting effects of income on children. (See Appendix A.)
We use total net family income (inclusive of EITC payments and net of other federal and state
taxes and transfers) as our measure of total family income, Iia. EITC income, χsiaa (Pia), is a
function of pre-tax income, Pia, for the year when child i is age a. We also take into account
other taxes, τ siaa (Pia). The superscript sia on the EITC and tax functions denotes which schedule a
child’s family is on; the EITC schedules only differ based the number of children in the household,
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while the more general tax function depends on a broader set of family characteristics.10 Therefore,
total net family income is given by
Iia = Pia + χsiaa (Pia)− τ siaa (Pia).
Central to our analysis is the variation in EITC schedules over time and the way in which EITC
expansions have differentially augmented the incomes of different families.
Our IV estimation strategy builds on that of Gruber and Saez (2002) by assuming that changes
in the EITC structure are independent of idiosyncratic family circumstances.11 As an instrument
for ∆Iia in estimating equation (3), we use
∆χIVa (Pi,a−1) ≡ χsi,a−1a (Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1])− χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1),
where Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] is an estimate of pre-tax income given lagged pre-tax income. In practice, we
regress pre-tax income on an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income and a fifth-order poly-
nomial in lagged pre-tax income when calculating Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]. This effectively yields predicted
changes in EITC income as a function of lagged pre-tax income, taking into account the fact that
income evolves over time in a predictable way and that the EITC schedule changes in some years.12
By holding fixed the type of EITC schedule (1 vs. 2+ children) si,a−1 in generating our instrument,
we only exploit variation in predicted EITC income due to government changes in EITC schedules
over time and not due to changes in family structure.
Of course, simply estimating equation (3) using ∆χIVa as an instrument is likely to yield biased
estimates for δ0, since changes in families’ simulated EITC payments are a function of age a−1 pre-
tax family income (Pi,a−1), which is likely to be correlated with the subsequent change in income
10Actual EITC schedules distinguish between earned and unearned income. For our sample period, federal EITC
schedules only differ based on whether there is one or more than one child in the household. Other taxes depend on
the number of children as well as marital status. While our empirical analysis takes these distinctions into account,
we ignore them here for expositional purposes. The empirical analysis also includes non-taxable income sources in
total family income. Finally, the empirical analysis also includes state taxes and transfers when constructing total
family income. Excluding state EITC payments from the instrument has little effect on the estimates, since there are
few states with EITC programs during our sample period. See Appendix A for further details.
11This strategy is loosely related to Feldstein (1995) and Currie and Gruber (1996), who use the effects of policy
changes on economy-wide aggregates rather than the distributional consequences of policy changes to identify their
parameters of interest. A Currie-Gruber approach would be more applicable if there was substantial variation in state
EITCs; however, few states had EITC provisions during our sample period (only 5 states by 1996 and 10 states by
1999). See Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) for a general discussion of the simulated IV methodology and its application.
12Given our strategy, the ideal (i.e. most efficient) instrument would be E[χ
si,a−1
a (Pi,a)|Pi,a−1] − χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1).
In practice, age a EITC income is difficult to predict based on lagged income due to non-linearity and discontinuities
in the EITC schedule. An intuitive approach would be to simply use lagged pre-tax income Pi,a−1 in place of
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] in creating our instrument. (Indeed, we did this in an earlier version of this paper.) This strategy (when
incorporating the control function as discussed below) yields consistent but much less precise estimates compared to
the approach taken here.
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due to such factors as measurement error, regression to the mean, and serially correlated income
shocks. Therefore, based on the insight of Gruber and Saez (2002), we augment the outcome
equation with a flexible function of Pi,a−1 when instrumenting. Letting Φ(Pi,a−1) reflect a flexible
function of lagged pre-tax income, we estimate
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +Φ(Pi,a−1) + ηia (4)
using ∆χIVa as an instrument for ∆Iia. Empirically, we employ the same functional form for
Φ(Pi,a−1) as we use in estimating Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]: we include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax
income and a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. This ensures that the variation
in our instrument used to identify δ0 comes from changes in the EITC schedule and not from
the level of lagged pre-tax income. Intuitively, this strategy estimates the extent to which the
differential income boosts associated with the EITC expansions (as determined by past income
levels) are met with increases in child achievement. If income has a positive effect on achievement,
we should observe greater increases in test scores among children from low-income families relative
to high-income families when the EITC expands.13
One can think of the polynomial Φ(Pi,a−1) in equation (4) as a control function. It is, therefore,
important that Φ(·) be flexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child
development shocks and lagged pre-tax income — we use a very flexible polynomial in lagged pre-
tax income. In the most general case, the control function should equal E[∆εia|Pi,a−1, xi,∆wia].
As such, if the evolution of income over time differs systematically with xi or ∆wia or if the
relationship between ∆εia and pre-tax income depends on xi or ∆wia, then the control function
should be generalized to account for these relationships. Recognizing this possibility, we consider
alternative specifications using a more general control function that interacts Φ(Pi,a−1) with all xi
and ∆wia regressors.14
Our approach relies on one fundamental assumption: the relationship between child develop-
13Figure 1b makes clear that the largest changes in our instrument occur for low to moderate income families. If
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] = Pi,a−1, then the value of the instrument over time (as a function of pre-tax income) would be as
illustrated in Figure 1b. However, for very low earnings families, Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] > Pi,a−1 since their earned income
is predicted to rise. For example, families with zero earned income last period are predicted to earn roughly $4,000
in the current period. For such families with two or more children, the value of the instrument is approximately
$600 annually prior to 1995 and jumps to almost $1,500 in 1995 due to the large EITC expansion. (A family with
two kids earning $4,000 received approximately $600 annually in EITC benefits for 1987-1993 and roughly $1,500 for
1995-99. In all years, families with no earned income received $0 in EITC benefits. See Figure 1a.) Note that the
time invariant control function accounts for the fact that the value of the instrument varies by income even when
the EITC schedule does not change. As discussed below, our approach requires that the EITC schedule itself must
change over time to identify the effect of income on child achievement.
14Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of these issues. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a general
treatment of control functions. Linear spline functions yield similar results to those presented in the paper.
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ment shocks and lagged pre-tax income must be stable over time. In using a time invariant control
function Φ(·), our baseline analysis implicitly assumes that the relationship between ∆εia and pre-
tax income does not vary with time over our sample period. To relax this assumption, we explore
additional specifications that allow the control function to evolve smoothly over time or to vary
state by state in response to changes in state welfare or school accountability policies. However, it
is not possible to allow the control function to vary freely over time, since this would eliminate any
independent variation in our instrument ∆χIVa (Pi,a−1).
With a fully flexible (time invariant) control function, all identification comes from differential
changes in the EITC schedule over time. Our strategy would break down if the EITC schedule
did not change during our sample period, since there would be no independent variation in our
instrument given the control function Φ(Pi,a−1). In fact, our approach requires at least three periods
of data, since we need at least two different changes in the EITC schedule over time given a flexible
control function. To better understand identification, suppose that income did not change at all
over time. In this case, any changes in after-tax income would be driven solely by changes in the
EITC schedule. The validity of our research design, therefore, hinges on controlling flexibly for
pre-tax income with the control function. The fact that we use lagged pre-tax income is second
order.
Two minor practical issues arise in our analysis. First, the vast majority of EITC recipients
receive their credit after filing their taxes the following year. Therefore, we link test scores (typically
measured sometime between March and December in our data) with income earned in the previous
calendar year (reported during the same survey as test scores are recorded), referring to them as
‘contemporaneous’. Second, we only observe child achievement scores every other year as we discuss
further below. Thus, we use two-year differences rather than one-year differences in our analysis.
Appendix A briefly describes how this affects the estimating equations above.
4 Data
We use data from the Children of the NLSY and the main NLSY sample of mothers. These data
are ideal for studying the effects of family income on children for several reasons. First, we can link
children to their mothers, and second, we can follow families over time. Third, the NLSY contains
repeated measures of various child outcomes and comprehensive measures of family income. Finally,
the NLSY oversamples minority families, which provides a larger sample of families eligible for the
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EITC.15
The NLSY collects a rich set of variables for both children and mothers repeatedly over time.
For children, biannual measures of family background and cognitive achievement are available from
1986 to 2000. Detailed longitudinal demographic, educational, and labor market information for
the mothers is available annually from 1979 through 1994 and biannually thereafter. Equally
important, family income measures (for the previous calendar year) are available in all survey years
for the mothers up to 1994 and biannually thereafter.16 While the NLSY contains a broad array of
income questions, it does not ask an individual how much they received in EITC payments or paid
in taxes.17 Therefore, we impute a family’s state and federal EITC payment and tax burden using
the TAXSIM program (version 9) maintained by Daniel Feenberg and the NBER (see Feenberg
and Coutts, 1993 and http://www.nber.org/taxsim). One of the main benefits of the panel is that
we can estimate models that account for child fixed effects.
In our analysis, we focus on measures of scholastic achievement in math and reading based on
standardized scores on Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT). The assessments measure
ability in mathematics, oral reading and word recognition ability (reading recognition), and the
ability to derive meaning from printed words (reading comprehension). From 1986 to 2000, the
tests were administered biannually to children ages five and older; although, 92% of our estimation
sample is between the ages of 8 and 14. Children took each individual test at most five times due
to the age restrictions. See Appendix B for details.
To make the PIAT test scores more easily interpretable, we create normalized test scores with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one based on the random sample of test takers (i.e. exclud-
ing the poor, military, and minority oversamples). We also create a combined math-reading score,
which takes the average of our normalized math and reading scores. This is then re-normalized
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the random sample.18 Our full sample
that includes oversamples of blacks and hispanics has negative average normalized test scores, since
children in the oversamples are more disadvantaged on average.
15We exclude children from the oversamples of poor white families and military families, which were not followed
throughout our sample period.
16The survey reports many components of family income, which we aggregate into three categories of pre-tax/EITC
income: earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. See Appendix B for a description of these income
categories and how we impute missing observations.
17Take-up rates for EITC benefits are high. Both the IRS (2002) and Scholz (1994) estimate that roughly 80 to 87
percent of eligible households receive the credit.
18As discussed in NLSY79 User’s Guide, the initial standardized test scores we begin with are already normalized
by child age to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Thus, our re-normalized test score distributions are
nearly identical within each age group, having close to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. See Appendix B
for additional details on the PIAT tests and our normalization procedure.
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We restrict our main sample to children observed in at least two consecutive (even-numbered)
survey years between 1988 and 2000 with valid PIAT scores, family background characteristics,
and family income measures, since our primary analysis estimates models with child fixed effects.19
Because changes in family income are likely to mean something very different when there is a
change of marital status relative to when there is not, we also limit our sample to children whose
mothers did not change marital status during two-year intervals when test scores are measured. Our
main sample includes 4,412 interviewed children born to 2,401 interviewed mothers, with children
observed 2.2 times on average. Table 1 provides information on family income and EITC eligibility
over time for this main sample. The table reveals that median after-tax family income rose in
real terms from $23,463 reported in 1988 to $38,390 reported in 2000. The time trend in family
income, which outpaced inflation, is largely attributable to the aging of mothers in the sample. The
relevance of changes in the EITC schedule over time is also evident in Table 1. Roughly one-third
of children live in families which qualify for the EITC, a high rate that is partly due to the NLSY
oversampling of minorities. The largest EITC expansion is reflected in the sizeable increase in
EITC eligibility and payment amounts for 2+ child families between 1994 and 1996.
Table B1 in Appendix B describes sample characteristics based on EITC eligibility. Panel A lists
variables for the child that are included as controls in our baseline ‘difference’ specifications: child
gender, age, number of siblings, and race. Panel B includes additional variables used as controls in
our OLS ‘levels’ regressions and a robustness specification. These include mother’s characteristics
like age, completed education, AFQT score, and whether she lived with both natural parents at
age 14. It also includes the mother’s marital status in the previous year (corresponding to the year
income is measured), household composition variables, spouse’s age, and education measures of the
mother’s parents and spouse.
Column (i) provides summary statistics for our full sample. The average age of the children
in our sample is 11 and most children have at least one sibling. Over half the sample is black
or hispanic due to the oversampling of minorities. The average age of mothers is 33 years old,
although the youngest mother with a child in our sample is 25. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table
B1 break down the summary statistics based on EITC eligibility, while column (iv) reports the
19We exclude the 1986 survey year (which records income for 1985) and survey years 2002 onward to focus our
analysis on changes in the EITC, rather than the large changes in the tax code associated with the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 and the two ‘Bush’ tax cuts in 2001 and 2003. To focus on EITC changes, we also exclude observations
with family income levels above $100,000; although, including these observations has negligible effects when we
use a flexible control function. To minimize the influence of outliers and obvious measurement error, we also trim
observations with very large changes in income or large and unusual changes in reported welfare income. We employ
a detailed imputation procedure to impute some missing income values. See Appendix B for details.
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difference between eligible and ineligible families. Children from EITC eligible families (relative
to those that are ineligible) are more likely to be minorities and have mothers with less education
and lower AFQT scores. Their parents are also less likely to be married. These differences suggest
that some children will be more directly affected by changes in the generosity of the EITC (e.g.
black children with unmarried, low educated mothers versus white children with married, highly
educated mothers).
5 The Effect of Income on Cognitive Achievement
In this section, we discuss the estimated impact of family income on children’s math and reading
achievement. We first report standard OLS and differenced estimates of outcome equations (1)
and (2) under different assumptions about the dynamic effects of income. We also briefly discuss
estimates for a few additional specifications previously employed in the literature. We then turn
to our IV estimation strategy, which accounts for measurement error, permanent unobserved het-
erogeneity, and temporary unobserved shocks. We explore whether income changes have lasting
effects on child achievement, whether the effects vary across different demographic groups, and
whether income differentially affects younger versus older children. To establish the robustness
of our findings, we examine a number of different specifications, including regressions which ac-
count for time-varying state policies, more general control functions, and maternal labor market
participation.
5.1 OLS and Differenced Estimates
We begin by presenting OLS and differenced estimates of the effects of family income on our
combined math-reading measure of cognitive achievement. As a reminder, the differenced estimates
are based on two-year differences, since children are only administered the PIAT tests every other
year. Compared to most studies, we estimate more general models of child achievement, exploring
whether income has lasting effects on children.
Table 2 reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) under different assumptions about the per-
sistence of income effects. In the levels models we regress child achievement on total income and
include all the variables reported in Table B1 as controls. The specification we estimate in differ-
ences is slightly more general, since we allow achievement growth to vary by the child characteristics
listed in panel A of Table B1.20 Column (i) assumes the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model used by
20Below, we explore the robustness of our IV results to specifications that do not allow achievement growth to vary
by child characteristics, that allow achievement growth to depend on all of the family background variables listed in
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many previous studies. Estimated in levels, we find that a $1,000 increase in family income raises
math-reading test scores by 0.005 standard deviations. Estimated in differences, the effect is less
than one-fourth as large and no longer significant. These estimates are similar to corresponding
estimates in Blau (1999).
There are two reasons to expect a discrepancy between difference (or fixed effects) and cross-
sectional OLS estimates. First, measurement error is greater for income measured in differences
than in levels, so attenuation bias will be greater for difference estimators. Second, a correlation
between unobserved fixed effects (µi) and family income will bias cross-sectional OLS estimates.
The first bias is greater for difference estimates while the second only affects cross-sectional OLS,
so there is no a priori reason to prefer one type of estimator over the other. More importantly,
both approaches suffer from additional bias if unobserved transitory shocks to families and children
are correlated with family income.
Columns (ii)-(iv) estimate more general models that allow for the possibility that income effects
persist for up to two years into the future. Column (iii) reveals the difficulty in identifying the
persistence of income effects beyond one year due to the high degree of collinearity in earnings
over time. To improve precision but still allow for a difference between contemporaneous and past
income, column (iv) imposes δ1 = δ2 but allows for a separate effect of contemporaneous income,
δ0. The levels specifications in Panel A suggest that income effects are quite small and may last for
a few years, while difference estimates in Panel B suggest even smaller effects for current and lagged
income. For both panels, we also report the implied medium-term effects of increasing income by
$1,000 each year for up to three years. This is simply the sum of the estimated effects of current
and lagged income. These are quite modest and similar across columns (ii)-(iv), and suggest that
the coefficient in column (i) understates the medium-run effect of a sustained increase in income.
An alternative specification often seen in the literature regresses child achievement on a long-
run average of family income (generally averaging over all available income measures from the
past, present, and future). This specification is economically motivated by the standard lifecycle
or permanent income model, which assumes family investments in children depend on lifetime
or ‘permanent’ income rather than income in any particular period. Implicit is the assumption
that families can borrow and save in order to smooth their consumption and child investments
over time. A separate statistical argument can also be made for regressing child achievement on
average income rather than income received in any particular period. Because income is measured
with error, standard OLS level and differenced estimators will tend to be biased towards zero, and
Table B1, and that allow for differential growth rates over time.
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averaging may alleviate this problem. In practice, previous studies tend to estimate larger effects of
average income than of current income (e.g. Blau 1999). We find the same pattern: the relationship
between long-run average income and test scores is 70% larger compared to the relationship between
current income and achievement.21 One concern with using average long-run family income is the
difficulty in accounting for unobserved long-run heterogeneity using fixed effects strategies. Since
average family income is likely to be more strongly correlated with unobserved family characteristics
than is income for any particular period, estimates using long-run averages of family income may
be subject to greater omitted variable bias.
5.2 IV Estimates
We now turn to our IV approach to estimate the effects of family income on child achievement. We
begin with our simple ‘contemporaneous effects’ model in differences (equation 3) using simulated
changes in the EITC (based on lagged income) as instruments for changes in actual after-tax/EITC
total family income. As a practical matter, identification comes primarily from the substantial
expansion of the EITC schedule between 1993 and 1995; however, other smaller changes in the EITC
schedule also aid in identification. The approach reveals whether achievement scores systematically
increased more for families who were predicted to receive a greater boost in EITC payments during
years when the schedule expanded.
Our approach requires inclusion of a flexible function of lagged pre-tax income as detailed in
equation (4). We explored different ordered polynomials and found the estimates to be very similar
for orders four and above if we also include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income. To
be conservative, we use a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator for
positive lagged pre-tax income as our baseline ‘control function’. Our baseline specification allows
for differential growth in achievement based on a child’s gender, age, number of siblings, and
race. Below, we show that the results are similar for specifications with additional controls (i.e.
other factors affecting growth in test scores) and with more general control functions that interact
included regressors with the polynomial in income.
Table 3 reports baseline IV estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure, as
well as each of the individual PIAT subject test measures. The results in column (i) imply that a
$1,000 increase in family income raises math-reading achievement by 6% of a standard deviation,
a modest effect, but much larger than the comparable OLS estimates in column (i) of Table 2.22
21Estimating a specification analogous to column (i) in Panel A of Table 2, we find that a $1,000 increase in average
income (averaged over all available years in our data) raises math-reading achievement by 0.008 (s.e.=0.002).
22Since we use two-year differences in income and child outcomes, these estimates reflect the effects of increasing
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To place this estimate in perspective, in the OLS levels specification, having a mother who is
a high school graduate (versus a high school dropout) is associated with an increase of 17% of a
standard deviation in achievement. Looking at columns (ii) – (iv) in Table 3, the estimated effects of
income are noticeably lower for reading recognition, while the estimated effects of income on reading
comprehension and math are similar to the effects for our combined math-reading measure.
This table also reports the coefficient on our instrument in the first stage regression of changes
in total family income on changes in predicted EITC receipt. It is slightly larger than one, but not
significantly so. In general, this coefficient may deviate from one due to labor supply responses to
the EITC expansions or due to measurement error in income. As we discuss later in the paper, we
find some evidence of a modest effect operating through labor supply.
The key assumption in our analysis is that the relationship between child achievement growth
and lagged pre-tax income should be relatively stable over time if the EITC schedule is not changing.
Identification relies on linking changes in the income – achievement relationship with changes in
the EITC schedule over time. Of particular concern are systematic economic or policy changes that
would improve the test scores of children from lower-income families at the same time the EITC
expanded (most notably from 1993 to 1995). In this case, our IV estimators would mistakenly
attribute the achievement gains of disadvantaged children to the increased income their families
received from expansions of the EITC. We explore specifications in Table 4 that take into account
national time trends and changes in state-level school accountability and welfare policies. To
conserve space, we only report estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure.
The first specification in Table 4 includes year dummies in our baseline specification. This allows
average test scores to vary freely from year to year, and forces identification of our IV estimate
to come entirely from differences in predicted EITC changes across individuals (by lagged pre-tax
income) between any two years.23 This yields a similar point estimate (significant at the 0.10 level)
to that of Table 3, but the standard error increases by two-thirds. Specifications B and C in the
table allow for a linear time trend in test score growth; specification C also interacts the time trend
with the control function Φ(Pi,a−1) (i.e. the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator
for positive lagged pre-tax income). These specifications yield larger (and less precise) estimates
annual income by $1,000 for up to two years. As we show below with dynamic achievement specifications, these
estimates largely identify the impact of increasing income in the current year by $1,000, since earlier increases in
income appear to have small lasting effects. The estimates could also be inflated by about 15-20% to account for the
fact that EITC take-up rates are estimated to range from 80 to 87% (IRS 2002, Scholz 1994).
23Without time dummies, our estimates are identified even if everyone experienced the same predicted EITC change
between years as long as the EITC expanded more in some years than others. More generally, our IV specifications
that do not include time dummies are identified from changes in average EITC income and test scores over time as
well as differential changes in EITC income and test scores across individuals between particular time periods.
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when compared with our baseline estimate in Table 3. By interacting the time trend with the
control function, we address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and pre-tax
income is changing over time.
The next two specifications in Table 4 address changes in state policies that might directly affect
the relationship between child outcomes and family income or characteristics: school accountability
policies and welfare regulations. A few states began to introduce student testing/accountability
measures and welfare reforms in the early 1990s, which some studies have linked to improvements
in state test scores (e.g. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and Miller and Zhang (2008)).24 To
account for these reforms, we start by adding an annual indicator for whether the child’s state has a
‘consequential’ accountability policy (i.e. required testing with consequences for school performance)
to our baseline specification.25 The next specification examines whether accounting for welfare
reforms taking place in the 1990s (associated with statewide AFDC waivers and TANF) affects our
results. We include in our baseline specification an annual indicator equal to one if a state has any
of the following: (a) time limits on welfare receipt, (b) sanctions for violating work requirements, or
(c) school requirements for dependent children. As Table 4 shows, these additions have little affect
on our estimates. Finally, the last specification of Table 4 simultaneously accounts for national
time trends, state-level school accountability, and state-welfare reforms. The results are nearly
identical to our baseline estimates (with larger standard errors). In summary, we find no evidence
that time-varying policies or economic changes materially affect the estimated impacts of family
income on child achievement.
In Table 5, we return to dynamic models of child achievement that allow for lasting effects
of family income on children. We report estimates for the combined math-reading achievement
measure analogous to those of Table 2. Due to the limited number of major changes in the EITC
schedule, we only estimate the effects of income lasting up to two years into the future. Columns (i)
and (ii) allow for the possibility that income affects test scores up to one or two years later. Both
specifications suggest sizeable effects of contemporaneous income and effects of past income which
are smaller. Given the sizeable standard errors when multiple years of income are included, column
(iii) restricts both one- and two-year lagged income to have the same effect (i.e. δ1 = δ2). This
specification provides more precise estimates, but yields the same conclusion: contemporaneous
24Most states did not introduce school accountability policies or welfare reforms prior to 1996. A number of
states received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waivers in the early 1990s; however, most states
introduced welfare reforms with the introduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
in 1996. See Appendix C for a detailed description of our school accountability and welfare policy measures.
25These specifications also include an interaction of the accountability measure with the control function Φ(Pi,a−1).
We do the same for welfare policy indicators below.
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income plays an important role in achievement, with smaller effects from past income.26 The table
also reports the implied medium-term effects of a sustained increase in income for up to three
years. These medium-term effects are up to 50% larger than the contemporaneous effect estimated
in Table 3.
We draw two main conclusions from Table 5. First, there are small, but statistically insignificant,
effects of lagged income on math and reading achievement scores. The medium-term effects suggest
that our baseline estimates in Table 3, if anything, understate the effects of lasting income changes
on child achievement. Second, income appears to have important contemporaneous effects on child
achievement. Moreover, incorporating lasting effects of income does not substantially alter the fact
that income has a sizeable contemporaneous effect. So, while one would certainly like to more
fully determine the dynamic effects of family income on achievement, the simple ‘contemporaneous
effects’ model appears to provide reasonably good estimates of the short-run effects of income. We
focus on this baseline model in the remaining two tables.
Table 6 displays estimates from separate regressions for various population subgroups. Esti-
mates in the table reflect the impact of a $1,000 increase in current income on combined math and
reading achievement for the reported subgroups. The extent to which different subgroups are more
or less affected by changes in the EITC is reflected in the ‘Percent in EITC Range’ for each group.
Higher socioeconomic status (SES) groups have a lower probability of being affected by the EITC
and, therefore, a smaller instrumented change in income on average. This is reflected in the fact
that the first stage estimates for high SES groups typically have standard errors that are twice as
large as those for low SES groups.
Except for the final two columns, the table is organized such that estimates for more economi-
cally disadvantaged groups are reported at the top while estimates for more advantaged groups are
at the bottom. Achievement for children with low educated mothers increases significantly with
income, while achievement for children whose mothers attended at least some college is largely un-
responsive to income changes. One should exercise caution in interpreting the latter, however, since
the first stage is quite weak for children with more educated mothers. Changes in EITC schedules
do not provide a very good source of income variation for these families. We also estimate strong
and statistically significant effects of family income on the achievement of minority children; in
contrast, our estimates for whites are substantially smaller and the first stage is imprecise. Point
estimates also suggest that income raises test scores more among children in unmarried households
26A number of recent studies estimate similarly strong fade-out effects for the ‘value added’ of individual teachers
on student test scores (e.g. Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
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relative to married households, and more for children whose mother’s AFQT score is below the me-
dian compared to above the median; however, these estimates are fairly imprecise. Overall, these
estimates suggest that the effects of family income are greater for more disadvantaged children;
although, the difference is only statistically significant by maternal education.
A number of recent studies (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy
and Duncan 1999) suggest that income at early ages may have greater effects on development than
income received at later ages. In the second to last column of Table 6, we estimate the effects of
income separately for children age 11 or younger versus age 12 or older. These estimates suggest
slightly larger effects of income on achievement for younger children, although the difference is not
statistically significant. Unfortunately, we are unable to examine the effects of income at very early
ages, which is when many researchers find the largest effects. This is because the majority of our
sample (92% of the children) are age 8 through 14 when they take the PIAT tests.27
In the final column of Table 6, we estimate separate models for boys versus girls. The effect of
income for boys is twice as large as that for girls, although the standard errors are large enough
that the difference is not statistically significant. This result is similar to that found by Milligan
and Stabile (2009), who find that increased child benefit levels in Canada had stronger effects on
the academic performance of boys compared to girls.
Table 7 presents several additional specifications for the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model (com-
bined math-reading measure) to explore the robustness of our baseline results. Specification A in-
cludes additional control variables such as the mother’s age and education, her family background,
and her spouse’s characteristics in the differenced child outcome equation, while specification B
removes all control variables (except the control function) from our baseline specification. Neither
change in control variables has much impact on the estimated effect of family income. We next
explore a more general control function in specification C, interacting all of the baseline control
variables with lagged pre-tax income and the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. These interac-
tions address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and lagged income differs
based on the baseline controls. This more general control function does not appreciably change the
estimate.
Our estimates exploit variation in both state and federal EITC schedules when constructing
27Children do not take the PIAT tests in the NLSY until age five. The PIAT tests were initially administered to
children as old as 18, but this was capped at age 14 in 1994. Moreover, the PIAT reading recognition component
initially had problems which invalidated the test scores of many young children. Using the average of the math and
reading recognition tests (excluding reading recognition) as the dependent variable so as to broaden the sample to
include more young children yields a similar pattern by age: the estimated effect of income is 0.062 (s.e.=0.032) for
children age 11 or younger and 0.033 (s.e.=0.022) for children age 12 or older.
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our instruments. Specification D shows that the inclusion of state fixed effects in our specifications
has little impact on the coefficient of interest. This is true regardless of whether we use the state
EITCs to construct our instruments. Because few states had EITC provisions during our sample
period (5 states by 1996 and 10 states by 1999), the results are very similar when only using federal
changes in EITC schedules to construct our instruments.
Specification E in Table 7 uses NLSY-created weights for the initial sample of mothers to weight
observations. These estimates indicate a slightly smaller effect of family income on achievement;
however, the standard error is 12% larger than that of our baseline estimates without weights.28
Table 6 suggests that the effects of income may be stronger for more disadvantaged children.
Under this assumption, some researchers have preferred to measure income in logs rather than
levels. For comparison and as a check on the robustness of our findings, specification F of Table 7
uses log total family income as the right-hand side variable rather than income measured in levels.29
This specification implies that a 10% increase in family income raises achievement by 6.4% of a
standard deviation. For families with income of $12,000, an extra $1,000 would raise child math-
reading scores by 0.053 of a standard deviation, similar to our baseline IV estimate that uses income
measured in levels.
It is natural to question whether the large changes in the EITC generated important labor supply
responses among mothers which may have affected children separately from the direct effects of
income we aim to measure.30 If so, our strategy will attribute these additional effects to income
unless we also control for parental labor supply. Most empirical studies find very small negative
effects of the EITC expansions on hours worked by women who were already working. The literature
28Two arguments are often made for using sampling weights. First, they can produce more efficient estimates.
However, this is not generally true in the case of IV estimation and does not appear to be true in our application
based on a comparison of standard errors. A second argument sometimes made for using sampling weights is based on
heterogeneous ‘treatment effects’ and the desire for estimating a population average effect. Since blacks and hispanics
are over-represented in our sample, one might want to use sampling weights to obtain a population ‘average’ effect
of family income on achievement. However, it is well-known that IV does not generally yield a population average
effect, except in rare cases (see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 1998, Imbens and Angrist 1994, Wooldridge 1997). In
our context, regardless of whether we use sampling weights, IV estimates a weighted average of income effects for
blacks, hispanics, and whites; however, this weighted average is unlikely to reflect the true population average effect.
Estimates using the sampling weights should place a larger weight on the effect for whites vs. minorities. Thus, the
slightly smaller estimate for specification D relative to our baseline estimate in Table 3 is consistent with the finding
in Table 6 that income effects are larger for minorities than for whites.
29In this specification, we use ln
(
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] + χsi,a−1a
(
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]
))
− ln(Pi,a−1 − χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1)) as an
instrument for ∆ln(Iia).
30In principle, an EITC expansion may affect children in three ways. First, holding earnings constant, it increases
family income. Second, it may affect earnings through family labor supply responses. Both of these affect children
through available family resources. Finally, labor supply responses may directly affect children through parental time
spent with children. If labor supply responses to EITC schedule changes are small, the second and third effects will
be negligible, and we identify only the first effect. More generally, in controlling for labor supply, we identify the sum
of the first two effects (i.e. the effect of the total change in income).
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also finds a positive effect on labor market participation among single mothers, but small negative
effects on married mothers with working husbands (see Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa and Hoynes
2005). Specification G of Table 7 adds changes in maternal labor force participation and hours
worked to our baseline specifications as additional controls. An increase in the number of hours
a mother works has small negative estimated effects on children, whereas participation changes
have statistically insignificant effects. Most importantly, accounting for changes in mother’s labor
market participation and hours of work does not affect our main conclusion about the importance
of family income.31
Recall that total income increased by $1.27 for a $1 increase in predicted EITC payments in
the first stage of the baseline specification. The fact that the coefficient is slightly larger than one
(although not significantly so) is consistent with a modest bonus impact through increased labor
supply. Indeed, once labor supply is controlled for in panel G, the first stage coefficient drops to
0.90.
5.3 Interpreting IV Estimates
Our IV results indicate modest but encouraging effects of family income on children’s scholastic
achievement. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined math
and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Although modest in an absolute sense,
our estimates are large relative to much of the literature and relative to the OLS and differenced
estimates reported in Table 2. Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2007) also report IV estimates of
the effect of family income on child achievement that are much larger than their OLS estimates.
Their IV strategy exploits randomly assigned variation in family income supplements from ten
different income support and welfare experiments to identify the causal effect of income. Looking
at expansions in the Canadian child benefit program, Milligan and Stabile (2009) find even larger
effects of extra income on children’s test scores than we do. Like our approach, these two papers
use exogenous variation in income and focus on relatively disadvantaged families.
We speculate that a variety of factors may be responsible for our larger IV estimates relative to
traditional OLS and fixed effects or differenced estimates. A first possibility is that measurement
31The endogeneity of which mothers work and how much they choose to work is an obvious concern. We attempted
to treat participation as endogenous by using changing parameters of the EITC schedules (e.g. maximum credit
amounts, phase-in and phase-out rates) over time as additional instrumental variables for maternal labor market
participation (an approach similar in spirit to Blundell, et. al 1998, and Eissa and Hoynes 2006). This approach
yields statistically significant estimates for family income that are very similar to our baseline estimates; however, it
produces imprecise estimates for maternal labor force participation. Unfortunately, the first stage for maternal labor
supply indicates the instruments are weak in our sample.
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error produces attenuation bias for standard methods. Fixed effects and differenced estimators are
particularly affected by this problem, since changes in income are noisier than income measured in
levels. However, measurement error alone is unlikely to explain most of the gap between our IV
estimates and more traditional estimates. As reported in Section 5.1, the estimated effect of average
income (which should have less measurement error) is 70% larger compared to the estimated effect
of contemporaneous income in OLS specifications (0.0080 versus 0.0047) but still much smaller
than our IV estimates.
A second potential explanation is that income matters more for disadvantaged families and that
our IV estimates capture the effects of income for disadvantaged families who are affected by the
EITC expansions. Table 6 offers some support for this explanation. Furthermore, Løken, Mogstad
and Wiswall (2010) argue that nonlinear effects explain why OLS and FE estimators find little
evidence that family income matters, since these estimates place relatively little weight on poor
families in most studies. To further explore this issue, we split the sample into low, middle, and
high average total family income groups and use OLS to estimate separate effects of income for
each group.32 The effect of a $1,000 increase in average income is 0.026 (s.e.=0.009) for the bottom
quartile, 0.010 (0.004) for the middle two quartiles combined, and 0.010 (0.004) for the highest
quartile. The effect for the lowest income group is much larger than the effects for higher income
groups and closer to our IV estimates.
A third explanation recognizes that each EITC expansion effectively raised the annual incomes
of eligible families for many years in the future. For example, we estimate that for the median EITC
recipient, the 1993-95 EITC expansion raised total credit amounts over the years 1995-99 by nearly
four times the amount it raised credit amounts in 1995 alone.33 If families are forward-looking
and base their investment decisions on current and expected future income, we would expect them
to respond more to a lasting change in income than to a one-year change. A lasting increase in
income is also likely to alleviate family stress and improve family dynamics more than a comparable
32Given the NLSY oversampling of minorities and poor whites, our data contains a large number of low and
moderate income families. The lowest quartile corresponds to families earning less than $18,031 on average, the
middle two quartiles between $18,031 and $41,790, and the fourth quartile greater than $41,790. We use average
income rather than current income to minimize problems with measurement error and to capture more permanent
differences in income.
33To empirically investigate the persistence of EITC gains for families, we divide the cumulative three-year credit in-
crease (for 1995, 1997, and 1999) by the one-year credit increase for 1995 resulting from the large EITC expansion that
took place between 1993 and 1995. Specifically, we calculate [χ95(P95)+χ95(P97)+χ95(P99)]−[χ93(P95)+χ93(P97)+χ93(P99)]
χ95(P95)−χ93(P95) ,
where χs(Pt) reflects the simulated EITC credit based on the schedule from year s and pre-tax income reported for
year t. The median of this ratio (for those who received any EITC in 1995) is 2.33, while the 25th and 75th percentiles
of this ratio are 1.51 and 3.12, respectively. Extrapolating based on the median ratio implies that a $1 increase in
current EITC income translates into a $3.88 increase in EITC income over the next five years.
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temporary increase. In this case, our IV estimator identifies the effect of increasing annual income
by $1,000 for many years into the future and not just a single year. On the other hand, OLS and
difference estimators identify the effect of a much more short-lived increase in income, since most
of the underlying variation in income over time is transitory (or measurement error).34 Thus, it is
not surprising that our IV estimates exceed our OLS and difference estimators.
A final possible explanation for larger IV estimates may have to do with the nature of EITC
income relative to other income sources. Three features of the EITC are somewhat special. First,
the EITC is typically paid out in lump sum fashion after families file their taxes (many EITC
recipients even receive an automatic refund at filing), and families may spend these lump-sum
transfers differently than they spend more traditional income flows (Barrow and McGranahan
(2000) and Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008)). Second, since EITC payments explicitly
depend on having children in the household, families may feel some obligation to spend it on
their children. Third, EITC payments come in the mail with tax returns or are direct deposited
into family accounts. As such, mothers may be more likely to gain control of EITC payments than
fathers (compared to other sources of income). A number of studies empirically find that household
expenditures on children increase with the share of family income going to mothers (e.g. Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, and Ward-Batts 2008).
6 Conclusion
Understanding the consequences of growing up poor for a child’s well-being is an important research
question, but one that is difficult to answer due to the potential endogeneity of family income. The
question is particularly interesting to policymakers, since part of the explicit rationale for income
support programs (such as the EITC) is to improve the lot of children. Past estimates of the effect
of family income on child development have often been plagued by omitted variable bias. That is,
children growing up in poor families are likely to have home environments or face other challenges
which would continue to affect development even if family income rose substantially.
In this paper, we use an IV strategy to estimate the causal effect of income on children’s math
and reading achievement. Using a panel of 4,412 children matched to their mothers allows us to
address problems associated with both unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous transitory income
shocks. Our IV approach exploits the large non-linear changes in the EITC in the late 1980s and
1990s as an exogenous source of variation in family income levels. The largest of these EITC
34See Dahl and Lochner (2005) for a more formal discussion of these issues.
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changes doubled benefit amounts for some families between 1993 and 1997, accounting for as much
as $2,100 in extra income (measured in year 2000$). Over the time period in our sample, the EITC
expansions raised average family income by more than 10% for EITC eligible families with two or
more children.
We find that extra family income has a modest, but encouraging, causal effect for children
growing up in poor families. Our IV results indicate that current income has significant effects
on a child’s math and reading test scores. The baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in
income raises contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Over
the entire sample period (1987–1999), the median EITC payment for eligible two-child families
increased by $1,670 (in year 2000$), implying an average test score increase of 10% of a standard
deviation for this group.
Our estimates also suggest that the effects are larger for children growing up in more disad-
vantaged families, younger children, and boys. The results are robust to a variety of alternative
specifications, including regressions which account for time-varying state policies, general control
functions, and maternal labor market participation. Simple dynamic models suggest that contem-
poraneous income has the largest effect on achievement, with small effects from past income. An
interesting avenue for future research would be to explore why income has modest contemporaneous
effects but small long-run effects on achievement.
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Appendix A: Methodological Issues
Details on EITC, Tax, and Net Total Income Measures
We create three family income categories based on the many income components in the NLSY:
earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. Earned income includes income from
wages and salary. Unearned income includes reported income from a business or farm, unemploy-
ment compensation, and a residual catch-all question referring to interest income, social security
payments, net rental income, and income from other regular sources. Non-taxable income includes
income from veteran benefits, worker compensation or disability payments, welfare payments (in-
cluding food stamps, Supplementary Security Income, or other public assistance), and child support.
All of these measures include income received by the mother as well as her spouse. (Income from
unmarried partners is not included.)
To calculate actual EITC and tax amounts, we use both earned and unearned income, running
them through TAXSIM for the appropriate year.35 These are added (EITC) to and subtracted
(taxes) from pre-tax/EITC income to create our measure of total net family income, Iia.
To calculate predicted EITC amounts for use in our instruments, we only input earned in-
come (or predicted earned income) into TAXSIM. We do this because unearned income amounts
are generally quite low (and noisy) for persons otherwise qualifying for the EITC, and including
unearned income would require the inclusion of a more complicated control function used in IV
that depended on both earned and unearned income. The analysis is greatly simplified by leaving
unearned income out, with little sacrificed in terms of identifying power.
IV Estimation of the Contemporaneous Effects Model
To understand the implicit assumptions underlying our IV strategy, begin by assuming that α =
β = 0 in equation (3). In this case, IV will provide consistent estimates if
Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1,∆χIVa ] = Φ(Pi,a−1).
The a subscript on the expectation on the left reflects that it is taken with respect to the age a
conditional distribution of ∆εia. The key assumptions underlying this approach are (i) the control
function Φ(·) is flexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child development
shocks and pre-tax income, and (ii) the stability of that relationship over time.
First, notice that Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1,∆χIVa (Pi,a−1)] = Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1] if factors affecting the EITC
schedule, sia, do not affect the relationship between shocks to child outcomes and pre-tax income. If
everyone was on the same schedule, this would be trivially satisfied since ∆χIVa would only be a func-
tion of pre-tax income. Endogeneity problems can be traced to the relationship between ∆εia and
35We put all unearned income through TAXSIM as ‘unemployment income’ since the program treats it as fully
taxable income during our sample period, but it appropriately does not treat it as earned income in computing the
EITC. While in later years persons with ‘excessive’ interest and dividend income (above $2,200-2,500 depending on
the year) should be disqualified from the EITC, we are unable to separate this source of income from social security
payments, rental income or other regular sources of income. By including this income with other unearned income
and putting it through TAXSIM as ‘unemployment income’, we effectively ignore this feature of the EITC rules.
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(Pi,a−1, Pia). Stability of this relationship over time (i.e. Ea(∆εia|Pi,a−1, Pia) = E(∆εia|Pi,a−1, Pia)
so the expectation no longer depends on age, a) and stationarity of the income evolution pro-
cess (i.e. the joint distribution g(Pi,a−1, Pia) = g(Pi,a′−1, Pia′) for all a, a′) further implies that
Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1] = E[∆εia|Pi,a−1] = Φ(Pi,a−1) for a sufficiently flexible function Φ(·). Note there is
nothing inherently special regarding the use of lagged pre-tax income in this approach; one could
reverse the roles played by current and lagged pre-tax income and include a flexible function of
current income as the control function.
More generally, when α and β are not zero, one can incorporate xi and ∆wia into the control
function. The estimates would then be consistent if
Ea[∆εia|xi,∆wia, Pi,a−1,∆χSIVa ] = Φ(xi,∆wia, Pi,a−1).
Estimating such a general control function can be empirically difficult due to the curse of dimension-
ality. Most of our regressors are indicator variables. In practice, we explore control functions with
high order polynomials in Pi,a−1 and interactions of those polynomials with all of our regressors.
In general, the inclusion of interaction terms has negligible effects on estimates of our parameters
of interest, and the simpler Φ(Pi,a−1) is sufficient.
IV Estimation of Models with Lasting Income Effects
Estimating more general first-difference models with lagged changes in income like equation (2) re-
quires additional instruments for each new income term. We use instruments analogous to those de-
scribed above. For example, when we estimate equation (2) using IV, we use χsi,a−1a−` (Eˆ[Pi,a−`|Pi,a−1])−
χ
si,a−1
a−`−1(Eˆ[Pi,a−`−1|Pi,a−1]) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−`.36 It is still necessary to include the control
function Φ(Pi,a−1), and the assumptions discussed above must still be satisfied.
Estimating Equations using Two-Year Differences
Our data only contain measures of child outcomes every other year; however, our model of child
outcomes (equation (1)) is based on annual income. We assume (1) describes child outcomes;
however, we estimate our models using two-period differences. If we define ∆2 to be the two-period
difference operator (e.g. ∆2yia = yia − yi,a−2), then our model implies:
∆2yia = x′iα+∆2w
′
iaβ +∆2Iiaδ0 +∆2Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+∆2Ii,a−LδL +∆2εia. (2′)
We estimate versions of this equation for L = 0, 1, 2. While estimation of the ‘contemporaneous
effects’ model (i.e. L = 0) does not require income data for years in-between when child outcome
measures are observed, estimation of other models does.
36Notice, all simulated EITC changes are based on the schedule and pre-tax income level as of age a − 1. This
maintains tractability, since it does not require inclusion of other lagged values of pre-tax income in the con-
trol function Φ(Pi,a−1). Using different lags of pre-tax income to simulate EITC changes for each lag (e.g. using
χ
si,a−1
a−` (Eˆ[Pi,a−`|Pi,a−`−1]) − χ
si,a−1
a−`−1(Pi,a−`−1) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−`) would require including each year of
lagged pre-tax income levels (used to create the instruments) in the control function.
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Appendix B: Description of NLSY Children Data
Child Characteristics
Most child characteristics are taken directly from the Children of the NLSY survey responses in even
numbered years from 1986 to 2000. PIAT math and reading tests were administered biannually
primarily to children ages five to fourteen.37 We create normalized measures of PIAT math and
reading using the standardized scores. These scores are initially normed by the NLSY based on
a random sample of children in 1968 to have a constant mean (100) and standard deviation (15)
for each age. For interpretation purposes, we re-normalize math, reading recognition, and reading
comprehension scores by subtracting the sample mean from the NLSY random sample and then
dividing by the sample standard deviation. This produces individual test scores with a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one for the random sample of respondents. To create a combined
math-reading score, we average the normalized math and reading measures and then re-normalize
to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one (based on the random sample).
Parental Characteristics
Most parental characteristics are taken directly from the NLSY. Additionally, we create an age-
adjusted, normalized AFQT measure using the percentile scores based on the 1979 calculation. We
first create a normalized value by subtracting off the mean from the random sample and dividing
by the sample standard deviation. Then, we regress these normalized scores on age dummies and
use the residuals from this regression as our adjusted AFQT measure. We also fill in missing values
for education, marital status, and spousal age using observed values in surrounding years.
Family Income
We calculate total family income combining all available measures of income in the NLSY, deflating
them using the annual CPI-U so that they are in year 2000 dollars. Because some of the income
components are missing in one or more years, we use a detailed imputation procedure to maintain
a large representative sample. (We note, however, that imputations play little role in estimation of
our contemporaneous effects model; they are more important for models with lagged income. This
is because income is only observed every other year after 1994, and models with lagged income
require the odd-numbered years.) We begin by describing the available measures of family income
from a battery of questions that vary slightly over time; then, we discuss imputation of missing
values. Appendix A discusses details regarding the aggregation of these measures into total family
income and determining EITC and tax amounts.
We utilize reported income of the respondent (i.e., the child’s mother) and her spouse from the
following sources: (i) wages, salary and tips (including income from military service); (ii) business
37Many children ages 5-7 do not have valid scores for the reading recognition test, because their scores were out of
range based on the national norming sample in 1968. Starting in 1994, the tests were given only to children who had
not reached their 15th birthday by the end of the calendar year. Around two percent of children took the PIAT tests
after their 15th birthday before this rule was put in place. We include these children in our analysis, but the results
are very similar if they are excluded. See the NLSY79 User’s Guide for details.
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and farm income; (iii) unemployment income; (iv) income from savings, net rental income, and
social security income; (v) veteran benefits, worker compensation, and disability payments; (vi)
welfare/AFDC, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income or other public assistance; and (vii)
child support.
For all survey years (1979-1994, 1996, 1998, 2000), we impute each of these income sources
separately based on the full panel of responses for individuals. Our different imputations largely
reflect the relative importance of each income measure in computing total family income. Sources
(i)-(iii) are imputed separately for the mother and her spouse, while all other sources are combined
for both and imputed as a single measure. For wage, salary, and military income (source i), we
use an individual-specific regression of income on age and age-squared to impute missing income
observations. Only observations when an individual is age 22 or older are used in the regression,
and we only impute missing observations when at least 8 non-missing observations are available.
To impute missing observations for sources (ii) and (iv), we use individual-specific regressions of
income on age (only using observations when an individual is age 22 or older and requiring at least 6
non-missing values). To impute missing observations for all other sources, we use individual-specific
means (for ages 22 or older when at least 4 non-missing values are available). For non-survey years
1995, 1997, and 1999, we impute each income source as the average of adjacent year reports. (These
‘odd year’ imputations are only used in the dynamic specifications of Tables 2 and 5.) More detailed
notes on the imputation procedure are available from the authors upon request.
We trim the sample to exclude the approximately 1% of observations with two-year after-tax
total income changes of greater than $40,000 in absolute value (in year 2000 dollars). We note that
welfare income measures in the NLSY sometimes show implausibly large jumps across surveys.
Therefore, we further trim the 11% of observations with welfare changes exceeding $2,500 (in abso-
lute value) if there is not a corresponding change in earned income (of the opposite sign) that is at
least as large. Modest changes in these trimming rules have little effect on our estimates; however,
failure to trim at all greatly reduces the precision of our estimates. For example, trimming obser-
vations with welfare changes exceeding $4,000 (in absolute value) without a corresponding change
in earned income trims 7.5% of observations and yields similar results compared to the baseline IV
estimates: the effect of income on combined math-reading achievement is 0.066 (s.e.=.027) versus
0.061 (s.e.=.023) in Table 3.
Appendix C: State-level School Accountability and Welfare Reform
Measures
Our measures of accountability and welfare reform are taken from Appendix Table 2 of Miller
and Zhang (2008). Their accountability measures are largely due to Hanushek and Raymond
(2005), who distinguish between ‘consequential’ accountability, which attaches consequences to
school performance, and ‘report card’ accountability, which simply provides public report cards for
schools. Their data reports three states as introducing accountability in ‘1993 or earlier’. Based
on checks of State Department of Education websites, we code the introduction of accountability
in Wisconsin as 1991, North Carolina as 1993, and Connecticut as 1988. Other states that were
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early to introduce ‘consequential’ accountability include Texas (1994) and Kentucky (1995).
Miller and Zhang (2008) document the introduction of three types of welfare reforms that took
place at the state level since the early 1990s: limits on the amount of time a person (over a spell or
over one’s lifetime) can remain on welfare; sanctions (including partial or full reduction in welfare
benefits) on recipients not meeting work or schooling requirements; and schooling requirements
for children (e.g. maintaining minimum grades or requiring attendance). The following states
introduced at least one of these reforms prior to 1996: New Jersey (1992); Illinois, Iowa, and
Utah (1993); Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, South Dakota, and Vermont (1994); Arizona, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Missouri (1995).
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Figure 1a: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children (Year 2000 Dollars)
0 4000 8000 12000 16000 20000 24000 28000 32000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Income
EI
TC
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997, 1999
Figure 1b: Two-Year Changes in EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children
(Year 2000 Dollars)
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Table 1. Family Income, EITC Eligibility, and EITC Payments over Time (in Year 2000 $)
Fraction of EITC Payment as a
Children Fraction of Family
in EITC Median EITC Income (if Eligible)
Number of Median Lagged Eligible Payment 1 Child 2+ Child
Year Children Family Income Families (if Eligible) Families Families
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1988 1,186 23,463 0.31 547 0.05 0.05
1990 1,186 24,791 0.35 718 0.05 0.05
1992 1,648 26,852 0.31 833 0.06 0.06
1994 1,655 28,832 0.36 1,124 0.09 0.07
1996 1,682 34,988 0.34 1,917 0.10 0.13
1998 1,349 38,179 0.34 2,031 0.10 0.14
2000 1,088 38,390 0.35 2,217 0.11 0.16
All 9,794 30,491 0.34 1,124 0.08 0.10
Notes: Data are from the Children of the NLSY linked to their mothers in the main NLSY79. The
unit of observation is a child. The sample is restricted to those used in our baseline IV analysis in
Table 3. Children must have valid math and reading PIAT scores, child control measures in panel
A of Table B1, and family income measures for the reported year. Children must also have at least
two years of valid observations to be included. Year in column (i) refers to the NLSY survey year;
income and EITC payment variables refer to the previous year’s income. Family income includes
tax payments and tax credits (including the EITC); the sources for family income include earned
income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Family Income on Math-Reading Achievement
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Estimated in Levels
Current Income 0.0047** 0.0031** 0.0022 0.0023
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0022 0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0024)
Lagged Income (t-2) 0.0015
(0.0019)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0017*
(0.0009)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0047** 0.0053** 0.0056** 0.0056**
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
B. Estimated in Differences
Current Income 0.0010 0.0015* 0.0010 0.0016*
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0005 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0011)
Lagged Income (t-2) -0.0007
(0.0009)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0001
(0.0005)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0010 0.0020* 0.0015 0.0018
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Sample Size (for both panels) 8,608 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Panel A ‘levels’ regressions (equation 1) control for all variables listed
in Appendix Table B1. Panel B ‘difference’ regressions (equation 2) use two-period differences and
control for baseline variables in Panel A of Table B1. Samples include children taking a math or
reading PIAT test in the 1988 survey year or later. ‘Medium-Term Effect’ is given by the sum of
current and all estimated lagged income coefficients in columns (i)-(iii) and the sum of the coefficient
on current income plus twice the coefficient on the sum of lagged income measures in column (iv).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at
the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 3: Baseline IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model
Combined Math Reading Reading
and Reading Recognition Comprehension Math
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Effect of Current Income 0.0610** 0.0359* 0.0613** 0.0582**
(0.0231) (0.0195) (0.0273) (0.0273)
1st Stage Coeff. on Instrument 1.270** 1.270** 1.270** 1.270**
(0.381) (0.381) (0.381) (0.381)
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1, an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fifth
order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All models are estimated in two-year differences to
account for unobserved child fixed effects. Sample size is 8,608 for all the columns. **Significant
at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 4: IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model Accounting for Time Trends and
Time-Varying State Policies (Math-Reading Achievement)
Effect of Current 1st Stage Coeff.
Income on Instrument
A. Year Dummies 0.0686* 0.745**
(0.0389) (0.348)
B. Linear Time Trend 0.0857** 0.847**
(0.0378) (0.334)
C. Linear Time Trend Interacted with Control Function 0.0806** 1.114**
(0.0399) (0.485)
D. State School Accountability Policies Interacted with 0.0533** 1.299**
Control Function (0.0221) (0.406)
E. State Welfare Policies Interacted with Control Function 0.0671** 1.312**
(0.0268) (0.436)
F. Time Trend, Accountability and Welfare Policies 0.0629* 1.192**
Interacted with Control Function (0.0339) (0.513)
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix
Table B1. All specifications are estimated in two-year differences to account for unobserved child
fixed effects. Sample size is 8,608 for all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 5: IV Estimates of Achievement Models with Lasting Income Effects
(i) (ii) (iii)
Current Income 0.0436* 0.0552 0.0515**
(0.0237) (0.0478) (0.0227)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0216 0.0135
(0.0408) (0.0733)
Lagged Income (t-2) 0.0207
(0.0382)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0187
(0.0255)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0652* 0.0894 0.0889
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0349) (0.0605) (0.0598)
F-statistics from 1st Stage 6.17, 3.59 3.98, 1.39, 2.16 5.53, 1.76
Sample Size 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured in
$1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1,
an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All
models are estimated in two-year differences to account for unobserved child fixed effects. ‘Medium-Term
Effect’ is given by the sum of current and all estimated lagged income coefficients in columns (i) and (ii)
and the sum of the coefficient on current income plus twice the coefficient on the sum of lagged income
measures in column (iii). F-statistics are for tests that all instruments equal zero in first-stage equations.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5%
level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 6. IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model for Various Subgroups
Mother’s
Mother’s Marital Mother’s Child’s Child’s
Education Race Status AFQT Age Gender
High School Black or Not Low Age
or Less Hispanic Married AFQT < 12 Male
Effect of Current Income 0.0536** 0.0800** 0.0807* 0.0709** 0.0764* 0.0879**
(0.0211) (0.0304) (0.0463) (0.0340) (0.0436) (0.0446)
1st Stage Coeff. 1.387** 1.282** 0.808** 1.089** 1.051** 1.056**
on Instrument (0.402) (0.428) (0.389) (0.433) (0.495) (0.472)
‘Percent in EITC Range’ 56.4 62.8 90.1 64.9 46.4 49.6
Sample Size 6,252 4,602 2,977 4,310 4,654 4,261
Some College White High Age
or More (not Hisp.) Married AFQT ≥ 12 Female
Effect of Current Income 0.0000 0.0145 0.0432* 0.0486 0.0515** 0.0399*
(0.0117) (0.0295) (0.0247) (0.0361) (0.0235) (0.0221)
1st Stage Coeff. 0.086 1.264 2.154** 1.466* 1.459** 1.479**
on Instrument (1.123) (0.798) (0.907) (0.802) (0.452) (0.489)
‘Percent in EITC Range’ 30.8 34.1 28.0 33.3 53.0 49.3
Sample Size 2,356 4,006 5,631 4,040 3,954 4,347
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1 and are estimated in two-year differences to account for
unobserved child fixed effects. ‘Percent in EITC Range’ is calculated as the fraction with lagged
pre-tax income less than or equal to $30,000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 7: Robustness of IV Estimates for ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model
Effect on 1st Stage Coefficient
Child Achievement on Instrument
A. Additional Control Variables
Effect of Current Income 0.0792** 0.934**
(0.0392) (0.404)
B. No Control Variables (Except Control Function, i.e., Polynomial in Lagged Earnings)
Effect of Current Income 0.0657** 1.318**
(0.0231) (0.380)
C. Interact Control Function with Baseline Regressors
Effect of Current Income 0.0617** 1.282**
(0.0232) (0.387)
D. Include State Dummies with Baseline Regressors
Effect of Current Income 0.0646** 1.186**
(0.0258) (0.387)
E. Use NLSY-supplied Weights
Effect of Current Income 0.0508** 1.240**
(0.0259) (0.477)
F. Log Family Income Measure
Effect of Log Current Income 0.6393** 1.210**
(0.2170) (0.298)
G. Controls for Mother’s Labor Market Participation and Work Hours
Effect of Current Income 0.0841** 0.901**
(0.0402) (0.371)
Effect of Mother’s Participation -0.007
(0.046)
Effect of Mother’s Work Hours (in 100’s) -0.026**
(0.012)
Notes: Specifications identical to those for ‘Combined Math and Reading’ in Table 3 with the noted excep-
tions. Specification A controls for all variables in Appendix Table B1 and state school accountability and
welfare policies (in addition to the control function in lagged pre-tax income). Specification B controls only
for the control function. Specification C interacts the control function with all baseline regressors. Specifi-
cation D includes state indicators along with all baseline regressors. Specification E uses the NLSY-supplied
weights for mothers (includes baseline controls and control function). Specification F uses log family income
rather than income measured in levels (includes baseline controls and control function). Specification G con-
trols for mother’s labor market participation and hours worked in addition to baseline regressors and control
function. Sample sizes are 8,608 for Specifications A–F and 8,238 for Specification G. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at
the 10% level.
Table B1: Sample Characteristics for Children, their Mothers, and their Families
Entire Eligible Not Eligible Difference
Sample for EITC for EITC (ii)-(iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Baseline Variables
male 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.00
age 11.00 11.23 10.88 0.35**
no siblings 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.05**
one sibling 0.39 0.35 0.42 -0.07**
two or more siblings 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
black 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.19**
hispanic 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.01
B. Additional Variables
mother’s age 33.45 33.25 33.54 -0.29**
mother a high school dropout 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.11**
mother a high school graduate 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.01
mother attended some college 0.20 0.17 0.22 -0.05**
mother graduated college 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.07**
mother’s AFQT score (normalized & age adjusted) -0.47 -0.77 -0.31 -0.45**
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.64 0.57 0.68 -0.11**
mother’s father present in household 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03**
mother’s mother present in household 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05**
number of adults in household 1.86 1.67 1.96 -0.29**
highest grade completed by mother’s father 8.42 7.34 8.97 -1.62**
highest grade completed by mother’s mother 9.65 8.93 10.02 -1.09**
mother married last year 0.65 0.37 0.79 -0.41**
age of mother’s spouse 35.39 35.28 35.42 -0.14
mother’s spouse a high school dropout 0.17 0.31 0.13 0.18**
mother’s spouse a high school graduate 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
mother’s spouse attended some college 0.20 0.14 0.21 -0.07**
mother’s spouse a college graduate 0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.14**
year 1993 1993 1993 0.13
missing observation indicators:
mother’s AFQT score 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01*
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00*
mother’s father present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother’s mother present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of adults in household missing 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
highest grade completed by mother’s father 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03**
highest grade completed by mother’s mother 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
age of mother’s spouse 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother’s spouse’s education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of child-year observations 9,794 3,305 6,489
number of children 4,412 2,035 3,236
Notes: Unit of observation is a child-year, where children and parents can appear repeatedly in the sample.
The sample is restricted to observations used in our IV analysis: children must have valid math and reading
PIAT scores, child control measures (in panel A), and family income measures in a year to be included.
Children must also have at least two years of valid observations to be included. Race of the child is based
on the reported race of the mother. Mother’s education variables represent completed education when
the mother is age 23. Average spousal education and age are reported for the sample of married mothers
(sample sizes are 6,332, 1,233 and 5,099 for columns (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively). In column (iv), **
denotes statistical significance at 5% level, and * denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement:
Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit
Gordon B. Dahl∗
University of California, San Diego
and NBER
Lance Lochner
University of Western Ontario
and NBER
November 19, 2010
Abstract
Past estimates of the effect of family income on child development have often been plagued
by endogeneity and measurement error. In this paper, we use an instrumental variables strategy
to estimate the causal effect of income on children’s math and reading achievement. Our iden-
tification derives from the large, non-linear changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
over the last two decades. The largest of these changes increased family income by as much
as 20%, or approximately $2,100, between 1993 and 1997. Using a panel of roughly 4,500 chil-
dren matched to their mothers from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth datasets allows us
to address problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous transitory income
shocks, and measurement error in income. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase
in income raises combined math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation in the
short-run. Test gains are larger for children from disadvantaged families and are robust to a
variety of alternative specifications.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, 13.2 million children in the U.S. under the age of 18, or more than one in six children, were
living in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Given such a high poverty rate, the consequences
of growing up poor on child well-being and future success has emerged as an important research
topic. Of particular interest is whether income support programs like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) can improve child development. However, the extent to which income maintenance
programs, and family income more generally, impact children is not easily estimated.
The major challenge faced by researchers attempting to estimate the causal effect of family
income on children’s outcomes has been the endogeneity of income. Children growing up in poor
families are likely to have adverse home environments or face other challenges which would continue
to affect their development even if family income were to increase substantially. Furthermore, year-
to-year changes in family circumstances like parental job loss or promotion, illness, or moving
to a new neighborhood may affect both family income as well as family dynamics and parenting
behavior. The latter poses a problem for traditional empirical studies that fail to separately identify
the effects caused by changes in income from the effects of changes in other unmeasured family
circumstances. These concerns have long prevented the literature from reaching a consensus on
whether family income has a causal effect on child development (see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
(1997), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Mayer (1997)).
Since the mid-1990s, one of the largest federal anti-poverty programs in the U.S. has been the
EITC, which provides cash assistance to low-income families and individuals who have earnings
from work.1 Low income families with two or more children can receive a credit of up to 40% of
their income in recent years (up to $4,824 in 2008), while families with one child can receive a credit
of up to 34%. In 2007, the EITC provided $48.7 billion in income benefits to 25 million families
and individuals, lifting more children out of poverty than any other government program (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). It is natural to ask what effect the EITC and other income
maintenance programs have on disadvantaged children.
Expansions of the EITC in the late 1980s and 1990s provide an exogenous source of income
variation for American families that we use to identify the effects of family income on child achieve-
ment. Figure 1 shows that EITC expansions over this period were sizeable and primarily benefitted
low to middle income families. Not only did the maximum benefit amount increase substantially,
1See Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for detailed descriptions of the EITC program and a
summary of related research.
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but the range of family income which qualified families for EITC benefits also expanded. The figure
shows that two-child families with pre-tax incomes ranging from $12,000-16,000 would have seen
their EITC payments increase by as much as $900 from 1987 to 1993 and another $2,100 between
1993 and 1997.2 The maximum subsidy rate for low income families with two children doubled
from 19.5% to 40% of earned income over the latter period.3
We estimate the impact of changes in family income (resulting from the EITC expansions) on
child cognitive achievement. Our estimation strategy is based on the fact that low to middle income
families benefitted substantially from expansions of the EITC in the late-1980s and mid-1990s while
higher income families did not. To the extent that income affects child achievement, we should
observe relative improvements in the test scores of children from families benefitting the most from
the EITC expansions.
Our analysis uses panel data on almost 4,500 children matched to their mothers in the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). These data contain a rich set of income
and demographic measures. More importantly, these data have up to five repeated measures of
cognitive test scores per child taken every other year, which allows us to account for unobserved
child fixed effects.
Our instrumental variables estimates suggest that current income has a significant effect on a
child’s math and reading achievement — a $1,000 increase in family income raises math and reading
test scores by about 6% of a standard deviation. The estimated effects are larger for children from
more disadvantaged backgrounds, for younger children, and for boys. Simple dynamic models
suggest that contemporaneous income has the largest effect on achievement, with small effects
from past income.
While modest, our instrumental variables estimates are larger than cross-section ordinary least
squares (OLS) or standard fixed effects (FE) estimates. Several explanations may account for this
difference. One is that income is noisily measured, so that OLS and FE estimates suffer from
attenuation bias. It is also possible that income matters more for the most disadvantaged and that
our instrument largely reflects the effect of income for these families. Perhaps the most interesting
2All dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers
(CPI-U) to adjust for inflation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to adjust maximum credit amounts and phase-
in/phase-out regions for cost-of-living changes in years that did not specifically legislate changes in the EITC schedule.
However, the federal tax adjustment is based on the CPI from the previous year (rather than the current year as
used in our calculations). This explains why the reported maximum credit in our figures is about $30 less in 1989
than it was in 1987.
3Expansions for single-child families were quite similar to those for two-child families prior to 1993; however, they
have been more modest since. While their phase-in subsidy rate nearly doubled from 18.5% to 34% between 1993
and 1997, their maximum credit amount ‘only’ increased by about 50%. Only 10% of the observations used in our
analysis are from single-child families.
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explanation is that expectations about future income play an important role in determining child
outcomes. In this case, permanent changes in family income should have larger effects on children
than do temporary changes. To the extent that changes in the EITC are expected to last longer
than most idiosyncratic shocks to family income, our instrumental variables estimates should be
greater than traditional OLS and fixed effect estimates (see Dahl and Lochner (2005)).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a brief literature review. Section 3
discusses our strategy for estimating the effect of family income on child outcomes. We then discuss
the data and document the large changes in the EITC in Section 4. Section 5 presents estimates of
the effect of income on math and reading test scores, including results from a variety of alternative
specifications and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Research
A growing empirical literature questions how poverty affects a child’s well-being and whether income
support programs can improve a child’s life chances. However, evidence on the extent to which
family income affects child development is mixed. Previous studies differ in data, methods, and
findings, as discussed in the collection of studies in Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) or the surveys
in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Mayer (1997).
Researchers have provided several explanations for why family income might affect child devel-
opment. First, poverty is associated with increased levels of parental stress, depression, and poor
health — conditions which might adversely affect parents’ ability to nurture their children (see,
e.g., McLoyd 1990). For example, in 1998, 27% of kindergartners living in poverty had a parent
at risk for depression, compared to 14% for other kindergartners (Child Trends and Center for
Child Health Research, 2004). Low income parents also report a higher level of frustration and
aggravation with their children, and these children are more likely to have poor verbal development
and exhibit higher levels of distractability and hostility in the classroom (Parker et. al, 1999).
Two recent working papers examine income transfer programs in Canada and the U.S. and find
evidence that income transfers improve a family’s emotional well-being. Milligan and Stabile (2009)
find significant positive effects on self-reported child and maternal mental health, and Evans and
Garthwaite (2010) find lower levels of self-reported maternal stress and a drop in the probability of
risky levels of biomarkers associated with stress. Extra family income might also matter if parents
use the money for child-centered goods like books, for quality daycare or preschool programs, for
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better dependent health care, or to move to a better neighborhood.4
Until very recently, empirical studies linking poverty and income to child outcomes have done
little to eliminate biases caused by the omission of unobserved family and child characteristics. Most
studies employ regressions of an outcome variable (such as scholastic achievement) on some measure
of family income and a set of observable family, child, and neighborhood characteristics. While these
studies reveal the correlations between income and child outcomes, they do not necessarily estimate
a causal relationship as Mayer (1997), Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), and others have pointed
out. Children living in poor families may have a worse home environment or other characteristics
that the researcher does not observe. These omitted variables may be part of the reason for
substandard achievement and may continue to affect children’s development even if family income
were to rise.
Blau (1999), Duncan, et. al (1998), and Levy and Duncan (1999) use fixed effects estimation
strategies to eliminate biases caused by permanent family or child characteristics. All three studies
use differences in family income levels across siblings to remove fixed family factors when estimating
the impacts of income on child outcomes. Using PSID data, both Duncan, et. al (1998) and Levy and
Duncan (1999) find that family income at early ages is more important for determining educational
attainment whether they control for fixed family effects or not. Using data from the Children
of the NLSY, Blau (1999) reaches somewhat different conclusions. He estimates larger effects of
“permanent income” when he controls for “grandparent fixed effects” (i.e. comparing outcomes for
the children of sisters) than when he does not. However, he finds smaller and insignificant effects of
current family income on achievement and behavioral outcomes when he uses fixed effect strategies
(regardless of whether he uses comparisons of cousins, siblings, or repeated observations for the
same individual) rather than OLS. While these studies represent a significant step forward, they
do not control for endogenous transitory shocks (e.g. parental job loss or promotion, family illness,
residential moves) and likely suffer from severe attenuation bias, since growth in income is typically
noisily measured.5
A few recent studies attempt to address these problems in a variety of ways. Two quasi-
4Low income parents have fewer children’s books in their homes and spend less time reading to their children,
markers which are negatively associated with future academic performance. Children in poor families are also less
likely to receive adequate health care and nutrition, both of which might affect performance in school. Finally,
neighborhood poverty has been associated with underfunded public schools and lower achievement scores among
young children (Child Trends and Center for Child Health Research, 2004).
5Taking a slightly different approach, Carniero and Heckman (2002) estimate the effects of income at different
child ages on subsequent college enrollment, controlling for the present discounted value of family income (a measure
of “permanent income”) and math test scores at age twelve. While they estimate significant effects of “permanent
income”, the estimated effects of income at early childhood ages and at later childhood ages are insignificant.
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experimental studies estimate the impacts of government income transfers on children. Duncan,
Morris and Rodrigues (2007) combine data from ten welfare and anti-poverty experiments in an
attempt to identify the effect of family income separately from employment and welfare effects
induced by the programs. Milligan and Stabile (2009) estimate the impacts of changes in child
tax benefits in Canada on child outcomes using variation in benefit changes by province and the
number of children in the household. These studies find modest to large effects of family income
on child educational and achievement outcomes that are largely consistent with our estimates. A
second set of studies (Løken 2010, Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2010) estimates the impact of
family income on the educational attainment and IQ of Norwegian children using regional variation
in the economic boom following the discovery of oil as an instrument for income. Generalizing
the specification of Løken (2010), Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) estimate that income has
sizeable impacts on education and IQ among children from low-income families; however, those
effects decline sharply among higher income families.6
The conclusions reached by recent studies suggest that unobserved heterogeneity and endoge-
nous income shocks are important concerns. Furthermore, they suggest that income effects may
be greatest among economically disadvantaged families. In the following section, we outline an
instrumental variables strategy which eliminates omitted variable biases due to both permanent
and temporary shocks correlated with family income and alleviates bias due to measurement error
in income. Given our source of exogenous income variation (changes in the EITC), our strategy
identifies the effects of family income on achievement for children from lower-income families.
Using our instrumental variables approach, we explore a few simple dynamic specifications
of child achievement that allow for lasting effects of family income on children. Few previous
studies explore dynamic relationships between family income and child achievement. Those that
do tend to focus on the relative importance of family income received at different child ages and
are subject to the same concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous family income
shocks as described above. Most of these studies find that income received when a child is young
has stronger lasting impacts than does income received during later childhood or adolescence (see
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997 and Duncan et al. 1998).7
6Other evidence from recent studies on the effects of parental education and job displacement indirectly suggests
that family income may have important effects on children. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) estimate that
increases in maternal (but not paternal) education led to increases in schooling attainment among Norwegian boys.
Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2006) estimate that an additional year of parental education reduces the probability
an American child repeats a grade in school by 2 to 4 percentage points. Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2008)
estimate that a father’s job displacement reduces family income in Canada by about 12% for up to 8 years and
reduces future earnings of the son by about 9%.
7Related studies estimate dynamic models of child development as a function of family and school inputs; however,
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3 Methodology
3.1 Modeling Child Achievement
Child achievement potentially depends on a child’s ability, as well as other past and present child
inputs (e.g. parental time, books, neighborhoods, schools, and home environments).8 Since family
income affects decisions about investment in children, as well as parental stress and whether the
general home environment is conducive to development, current and lagged family income have the
potential to affect child outcomes at any particular age. In this section, we model how changes in
family income (through such policies as the EITC) affect child achievement.
Let xi reflect observable permanent characteristics and µi reflect unobserved permanent ‘ability’
for child i (i.e., a child fixed effect). These measures can also incorporate unobserved long-run
differences across families. Let wia reflect time-varying characteristics and Iia total family income
(net of any taxes and transfers, including EITC payments) for child i at age a. Finally, let εia
denote any time-varying unobserved shocks to the child or family. Using this notation, a general
model for child outcome yia as a function of the child’s family characteristics and income history is
yia = fa(xi, wi0, ..., wia, Ii0, ..., Iia, µi, εia). For empirical purposes, it is useful to simplify the child
outcome equation as follows:
yia = x′iαa + w
′
iaβ + Iiaδ0 + Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+ Ii,a−LδL + µi + εia, (1)
assuming that the effects of income on child achievement last for L years.9
To focus on the role of income, equation (1) abstracts from the effects of past time-varying
characteristics; however, these can easily be incorporated in the same way as past income. Equation
(1) also abstracts from the possibility that income has different effects at different ages (i.e. effects
depend only on the time elapsed between when income is earned and when child achievement is
measured) or at different points in the income distribution (i.e. linearity in income is assumed).
We explore these issues empirically below.
they do not directly measure the effects of family income on children. For example, Todd and Wolpin (2007) estimate
a dynamic model of both family and school inputs into child development. Their estimates imply strong lasting
effects of family inputs (e.g. number of books in the home) but relatively weak effects of measured school inputs (e.g.
teacher salary). Building on the ‘value added’ literature aimed at estimating the effectiveness of individual teachers,
a number of recent studies find that teacher-induced gains in student test scores are sizeable in the short-run, but
they tend to fade out very quickly (Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
8See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for a clear exposition of the issues involved in identifying and estimating child
achievement production functions.
9One commonly used achievement model assumes that current achievement depends on current income and lagged
achievement (e.g. yia = x
′
iαa + wiaβ + Iiaδ + yi,a−1ρ + µi + εia). Recursively substituting in for lagged values of
achievement on the right hand side yields a specification very similar to equation (1) in which all lagged income
measures and other time varying characteristics would also be included.
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The specification in equation (1) allows for different effects of permanent characteristics at all
ages (i.e. αa). In our empirical analysis, we allow xi characteristics (e.g. race, gender, and age of the
child) to affect both the level and growth of child achievement. Taking first-differences of equation
(1) to eliminate the unobserved fixed effect µi yields:
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +∆Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+∆Ii,a−LδL +∆εia, (2)
where α ≡ αa − αa−1 is the effect of xi on achievement growth (assumed to be age invariant).
A common achievement specification in the child development literature assumes that there are
only contemporaneous effects of family income on children, ignoring any long-run effects. That is,
L = 0 in equations (1) and (2), which yields the following estimating equation in first-differences:
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +∆εia. (3)
This ‘contemporaneous effects’ model serves as our baseline and receives empirical support in our
analysis. It is difficult empirically to estimate more general models which allow prior income in
every year since birth to affect child outcomes. However, we also estimate specifications which
allow one and two year lags.
3.2 Using Changes in the EITC to Estimate the Effects of Income
The primary concern with least squares estimation of the models above is the possibility that
changes in unobserved factors affecting child development (i.e. ∆εia) are correlated with changes
in family income. More generally, ∆εia may be correlated with the entire history of income levels
given the strong intertemporal correlation of income and its tendency for regression to the mean.
To address this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy that takes
advantage of major changes in the EITC to estimate the effects of income on children. To simplify
the discussion, we focus on the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model of equation (3); however, we take
a similar approach in estimating the more general model implied by equation (2), which allows for
lasting effects of income on children. (See Appendix A.)
We use total net family income (inclusive of EITC payments and net of other federal and state
taxes and transfers) as our measure of total family income, Iia. EITC income, χsiaa (Pia), is a
function of pre-tax income, Pia, for the year when child i is age a. We also take into account
other taxes, τ siaa (Pia). The superscript sia on the EITC and tax functions denotes which schedule a
child’s family is on; the EITC schedules only differ based the number of children in the household,
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while the more general tax function depends on a broader set of family characteristics.10 Therefore,
total net family income is given by
Iia = Pia + χsiaa (Pia)− τ siaa (Pia).
Central to our analysis is the variation in EITC schedules over time and the way in which EITC
expansions have differentially augmented the incomes of different families.
Our IV estimation strategy builds on that of Gruber and Saez (2002) by assuming that changes
in the EITC structure are independent of idiosyncratic family circumstances.11 As an instrument
for ∆Iia in estimating equation (3), we use
∆χIVa (Pi,a−1) ≡ χsi,a−1a (Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1])− χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1),
where Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] is an estimate of pre-tax income given lagged pre-tax income. In practice, we
regress pre-tax income on an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income and a fifth-order poly-
nomial in lagged pre-tax income when calculating Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]. This effectively yields predicted
changes in EITC income as a function of lagged pre-tax income, taking into account the fact that
income evolves over time in a predictable way and that the EITC schedule changes in some years.12
By holding fixed the type of EITC schedule (1 vs. 2+ children) si,a−1 in generating our instrument,
we only exploit variation in predicted EITC income due to government changes in EITC schedules
over time and not due to changes in family structure.
Of course, simply estimating equation (3) using ∆χIVa as an instrument is likely to yield biased
estimates for δ0, since changes in families’ simulated EITC payments are a function of age a−1 pre-
tax family income (Pi,a−1), which is likely to be correlated with the subsequent change in income
10Actual EITC schedules distinguish between earned and unearned income. For our sample period, federal EITC
schedules only differ based on whether there is one or more than one child in the household. Other taxes depend on
the number of children as well as marital status. While our empirical analysis takes these distinctions into account,
we ignore them here for expositional purposes. The empirical analysis also includes non-taxable income sources in
total family income. Finally, the empirical analysis also includes state taxes and transfers when constructing total
family income. Excluding state EITC payments from the instrument has little effect on the estimates, since there are
few states with EITC programs during our sample period. See Appendix A for further details.
11This strategy is loosely related to Feldstein (1995) and Currie and Gruber (1996), who use the effects of policy
changes on economy-wide aggregates rather than the distributional consequences of policy changes to identify their
parameters of interest. A Currie-Gruber approach would be more applicable if there was substantial variation in state
EITCs; however, few states had EITC provisions during our sample period (only 5 states by 1996 and 10 states by
1999). See Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) for a general discussion of the simulated IV methodology and its application.
12Given our strategy, the ideal (i.e. most efficient) instrument would be E[χ
si,a−1
a (Pi,a)|Pi,a−1] − χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1).
In practice, age a EITC income is difficult to predict based on lagged income due to non-linearity and discontinuities
in the EITC schedule. An intuitive approach would be to simply use lagged pre-tax income Pi,a−1 in place of
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] in creating our instrument. (Indeed, we did this in an earlier version of this paper.) This strategy (when
incorporating the control function as discussed below) yields consistent but much less precise estimates compared to
the approach taken here.
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due to such factors as measurement error, regression to the mean, and serially correlated income
shocks. Therefore, based on the insight of Gruber and Saez (2002), we augment the outcome
equation with a flexible function of Pi,a−1 when instrumenting. Letting Φ(Pi,a−1) reflect a flexible
function of lagged pre-tax income, we estimate
∆yia = x′iα+∆w
′
iaβ +∆Iiaδ0 +Φ(Pi,a−1) + ηia (4)
using ∆χIVa as an instrument for ∆Iia. Empirically, we employ the same functional form for
Φ(Pi,a−1) as we use in estimating Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]: we include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax
income and a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. This ensures that the variation
in our instrument used to identify δ0 comes from changes in the EITC schedule and not from
the level of lagged pre-tax income. Intuitively, this strategy estimates the extent to which the
differential income boosts associated with the EITC expansions (as determined by past income
levels) are met with increases in child achievement. If income has a positive effect on achievement,
we should observe greater increases in test scores among children from low-income families relative
to high-income families when the EITC expands.13
One can think of the polynomial Φ(Pi,a−1) in equation (4) as a control function. It is, therefore,
important that Φ(·) be flexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child
development shocks and lagged pre-tax income — we use a very flexible polynomial in lagged pre-
tax income. In the most general case, the control function should equal E[∆εia|Pi,a−1, xi,∆wia].
As such, if the evolution of income over time differs systematically with xi or ∆wia or if the
relationship between ∆εia and pre-tax income depends on xi or ∆wia, then the control function
should be generalized to account for these relationships. Recognizing this possibility, we consider
alternative specifications using a more general control function that interacts Φ(Pi,a−1) with all xi
and ∆wia regressors.14
Our approach relies on one fundamental assumption: the relationship between child develop-
13Figure 1b makes clear that the largest changes in our instrument occur for low to moderate income families. If
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] = Pi,a−1, then the value of the instrument over time (as a function of pre-tax income) would be as
illustrated in Figure 1b. However, for very low earnings families, Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] > Pi,a−1 since their earned income
is predicted to rise. For example, families with zero earned income last period are predicted to earn roughly $4,000
in the current period. For such families with two or more children, the value of the instrument is approximately
$600 annually prior to 1995 and jumps to almost $1,500 in 1995 due to the large EITC expansion. (A family with
two kids earning $4,000 received approximately $600 annually in EITC benefits for 1987-1993 and roughly $1,500 for
1995-99. In all years, families with no earned income received $0 in EITC benefits. See Figure 1a.) Note that the
time invariant control function accounts for the fact that the value of the instrument varies by income even when
the EITC schedule does not change. As discussed below, our approach requires that the EITC schedule itself must
change over time to identify the effect of income on child achievement.
14Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of these issues. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a general
treatment of control functions. Linear spline functions yield similar results to those presented in the paper.
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ment shocks and lagged pre-tax income must be stable over time. In using a time invariant control
function Φ(·), our baseline analysis implicitly assumes that the relationship between ∆εia and pre-
tax income does not vary with time over our sample period. To relax this assumption, we explore
additional specifications that allow the control function to evolve smoothly over time or to vary
state by state in response to changes in state welfare or school accountability policies. However, it
is not possible to allow the control function to vary freely over time, since this would eliminate any
independent variation in our instrument ∆χIVa (Pi,a−1).
With a fully flexible (time invariant) control function, all identification comes from differential
changes in the EITC schedule over time. Our strategy would break down if the EITC schedule
did not change during our sample period, since there would be no independent variation in our
instrument given the control function Φ(Pi,a−1). In fact, our approach requires at least three periods
of data, since we need at least two different changes in the EITC schedule over time given a flexible
control function. To better understand identification, suppose that income did not change at all
over time. In this case, any changes in after-tax income would be driven solely by changes in the
EITC schedule. The validity of our research design, therefore, hinges on controlling flexibly for
pre-tax income with the control function. The fact that we use lagged pre-tax income is second
order.
Two minor practical issues arise in our analysis. First, the vast majority of EITC recipients
receive their credit after filing their taxes the following year. Therefore, we link test scores (typically
measured sometime between March and December in our data) with income earned in the previous
calendar year (reported during the same survey as test scores are recorded), referring to them as
‘contemporaneous’. Second, we only observe child achievement scores every other year as we discuss
further below. Thus, we use two-year differences rather than one-year differences in our analysis.
Appendix A briefly describes how this affects the estimating equations above.
4 Data
We use data from the Children of the NLSY and the main NLSY sample of mothers. These data
are ideal for studying the effects of family income on children for several reasons. First, we can link
children to their mothers, and second, we can follow families over time. Third, the NLSY contains
repeated measures of various child outcomes and comprehensive measures of family income. Finally,
the NLSY oversamples minority families, which provides a larger sample of families eligible for the
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EITC.15
The NLSY collects a rich set of variables for both children and mothers repeatedly over time.
For children, biannual measures of family background and cognitive achievement are available from
1986 to 2000. Detailed longitudinal demographic, educational, and labor market information for
the mothers is available annually from 1979 through 1994 and biannually thereafter. Equally
important, family income measures (for the previous calendar year) are available in all survey years
for the mothers up to 1994 and biannually thereafter.16 While the NLSY contains a broad array of
income questions, it does not ask an individual how much they received in EITC payments or paid
in taxes.17 Therefore, we impute a family’s state and federal EITC payment and tax burden using
the TAXSIM program (version 9) maintained by Daniel Feenberg and the NBER (see Feenberg
and Coutts, 1993 and http://www.nber.org/taxsim). One of the main benefits of the panel is that
we can estimate models that account for child fixed effects.
In our analysis, we focus on measures of scholastic achievement in math and reading based on
standardized scores on Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT). The assessments measure
ability in mathematics, oral reading and word recognition ability (reading recognition), and the
ability to derive meaning from printed words (reading comprehension). From 1986 to 2000, the
tests were administered biannually to children ages five and older; although, 92% of our estimation
sample is between the ages of 8 and 14. Children took each individual test at most five times due
to the age restrictions. See Appendix B for details.
To make the PIAT test scores more easily interpretable, we create normalized test scores with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one based on the random sample of test takers (i.e. exclud-
ing the poor, military, and minority oversamples). We also create a combined math-reading score,
which takes the average of our normalized math and reading scores. This is then re-normalized
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the random sample.18 Our full sample
that includes oversamples of blacks and hispanics has negative average normalized test scores, since
children in the oversamples are more disadvantaged on average.
15We exclude children from the oversamples of poor white families and military families, which were not followed
throughout our sample period.
16The survey reports many components of family income, which we aggregate into three categories of pre-tax/EITC
income: earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. See Appendix B for a description of these income
categories and how we impute missing observations.
17Take-up rates for EITC benefits are high. Both the IRS (2002) and Scholz (1994) estimate that roughly 80 to 87
percent of eligible households receive the credit.
18As discussed in NLSY79 User’s Guide, the initial standardized test scores we begin with are already normalized
by child age to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Thus, our re-normalized test score distributions are
nearly identical within each age group, having close to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. See Appendix B
for additional details on the PIAT tests and our normalization procedure.
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We restrict our main sample to children observed in at least two consecutive (even-numbered)
survey years between 1988 and 2000 with valid PIAT scores, family background characteristics,
and family income measures, since our primary analysis estimates models with child fixed effects.19
Because changes in family income are likely to mean something very different when there is a
change of marital status relative to when there is not, we also limit our sample to children whose
mothers did not change marital status during two-year intervals when test scores are measured. Our
main sample includes 4,412 interviewed children born to 2,401 interviewed mothers, with children
observed 2.2 times on average. Table 1 provides information on family income and EITC eligibility
over time for this main sample. The table reveals that median after-tax family income rose in
real terms from $23,463 reported in 1988 to $38,390 reported in 2000. The time trend in family
income, which outpaced inflation, is largely attributable to the aging of mothers in the sample. The
relevance of changes in the EITC schedule over time is also evident in Table 1. Roughly one-third
of children live in families which qualify for the EITC, a high rate that is partly due to the NLSY
oversampling of minorities. The largest EITC expansion is reflected in the sizeable increase in
EITC eligibility and payment amounts for 2+ child families between 1994 and 1996.
Table B1 in Appendix B describes sample characteristics based on EITC eligibility. Panel A lists
variables for the child that are included as controls in our baseline ‘difference’ specifications: child
gender, age, number of siblings, and race. Panel B includes additional variables used as controls in
our OLS ‘levels’ regressions and a robustness specification. These include mother’s characteristics
like age, completed education, AFQT score, and whether she lived with both natural parents at
age 14. It also includes the mother’s marital status in the previous year (corresponding to the year
income is measured), household composition variables, spouse’s age, and education measures of the
mother’s parents and spouse.
Column (i) provides summary statistics for our full sample. The average age of the children
in our sample is 11 and most children have at least one sibling. Over half the sample is black
or hispanic due to the oversampling of minorities. The average age of mothers is 33 years old,
although the youngest mother with a child in our sample is 25. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table
B1 break down the summary statistics based on EITC eligibility, while column (iv) reports the
19We exclude the 1986 survey year (which records income for 1985) and survey years 2002 onward to focus our
analysis on changes in the EITC, rather than the large changes in the tax code associated with the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 and the two ‘Bush’ tax cuts in 2001 and 2003. To focus on EITC changes, we also exclude observations
with family income levels above $100,000; although, including these observations has negligible effects when we
use a flexible control function. To minimize the influence of outliers and obvious measurement error, we also trim
observations with very large changes in income or large and unusual changes in reported welfare income. We employ
a detailed imputation procedure to impute some missing income values. See Appendix B for details.
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difference between eligible and ineligible families. Children from EITC eligible families (relative
to those that are ineligible) are more likely to be minorities and have mothers with less education
and lower AFQT scores. Their parents are also less likely to be married. These differences suggest
that some children will be more directly affected by changes in the generosity of the EITC (e.g.
black children with unmarried, low educated mothers versus white children with married, highly
educated mothers).
5 The Effect of Income on Cognitive Achievement
In this section, we discuss the estimated impact of family income on children’s math and reading
achievement. We first report standard OLS and differenced estimates of outcome equations (1)
and (2) under different assumptions about the dynamic effects of income. We also briefly discuss
estimates for a few additional specifications previously employed in the literature. We then turn
to our IV estimation strategy, which accounts for measurement error, permanent unobserved het-
erogeneity, and temporary unobserved shocks. We explore whether income changes have lasting
effects on child achievement, whether the effects vary across different demographic groups, and
whether income differentially affects younger versus older children. To establish the robustness
of our findings, we examine a number of different specifications, including regressions which ac-
count for time-varying state policies, more general control functions, and maternal labor market
participation.
5.1 OLS and Differenced Estimates
We begin by presenting OLS and differenced estimates of the effects of family income on our
combined math-reading measure of cognitive achievement. As a reminder, the differenced estimates
are based on two-year differences, since children are only administered the PIAT tests every other
year. Compared to most studies, we estimate more general models of child achievement, exploring
whether income has lasting effects on children.
Table 2 reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) under different assumptions about the per-
sistence of income effects. In the levels models we regress child achievement on total income and
include all the variables reported in Table B1 as controls. The specification we estimate in differ-
ences is slightly more general, since we allow achievement growth to vary by the child characteristics
listed in panel A of Table B1.20 Column (i) assumes the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model used by
20Below, we explore the robustness of our IV results to specifications that do not allow achievement growth to vary
by child characteristics, that allow achievement growth to depend on all of the family background variables listed in
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many previous studies. Estimated in levels, we find that a $1,000 increase in family income raises
math-reading test scores by 0.005 standard deviations. Estimated in differences, the effect is less
than one-fourth as large and no longer significant. These estimates are similar to corresponding
estimates in Blau (1999).
There are two reasons to expect a discrepancy between difference (or fixed effects) and cross-
sectional OLS estimates. First, measurement error is greater for income measured in differences
than in levels, so attenuation bias will be greater for difference estimators. Second, a correlation
between unobserved fixed effects (µi) and family income will bias cross-sectional OLS estimates.
The first bias is greater for difference estimates while the second only affects cross-sectional OLS,
so there is no a priori reason to prefer one type of estimator over the other. More importantly,
both approaches suffer from additional bias if unobserved transitory shocks to families and children
are correlated with family income.
Columns (ii)-(iv) estimate more general models that allow for the possibility that income effects
persist for up to two years into the future. Column (iii) reveals the difficulty in identifying the
persistence of income effects beyond one year due to the high degree of collinearity in earnings
over time. To improve precision but still allow for a difference between contemporaneous and past
income, column (iv) imposes δ1 = δ2 but allows for a separate effect of contemporaneous income,
δ0. The levels specifications in Panel A suggest that income effects are quite small and may last for
a few years, while difference estimates in Panel B suggest even smaller effects for current and lagged
income. For both panels, we also report the implied medium-term effects of increasing income by
$1,000 each year for up to three years. This is simply the sum of the estimated effects of current
and lagged income. These are quite modest and similar across columns (ii)-(iv), and suggest that
the coefficient in column (i) understates the medium-run effect of a sustained increase in income.
An alternative specification often seen in the literature regresses child achievement on a long-
run average of family income (generally averaging over all available income measures from the
past, present, and future). This specification is economically motivated by the standard lifecycle
or permanent income model, which assumes family investments in children depend on lifetime
or ‘permanent’ income rather than income in any particular period. Implicit is the assumption
that families can borrow and save in order to smooth their consumption and child investments
over time. A separate statistical argument can also be made for regressing child achievement on
average income rather than income received in any particular period. Because income is measured
with error, standard OLS level and differenced estimators will tend to be biased towards zero, and
Table B1, and that allow for differential growth rates over time.
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averaging may alleviate this problem. In practice, previous studies tend to estimate larger effects of
average income than of current income (e.g. Blau 1999). We find the same pattern: the relationship
between long-run average income and test scores is 70% larger compared to the relationship between
current income and achievement.21 One concern with using average long-run family income is the
difficulty in accounting for unobserved long-run heterogeneity using fixed effects strategies. Since
average family income is likely to be more strongly correlated with unobserved family characteristics
than is income for any particular period, estimates using long-run averages of family income may
be subject to greater omitted variable bias.
5.2 IV Estimates
We now turn to our IV approach to estimate the effects of family income on child achievement. We
begin with our simple ‘contemporaneous effects’ model in differences (equation 3) using simulated
changes in the EITC (based on lagged income) as instruments for changes in actual after-tax/EITC
total family income. As a practical matter, identification comes primarily from the substantial
expansion of the EITC schedule between 1993 and 1995; however, other smaller changes in the EITC
schedule also aid in identification. The approach reveals whether achievement scores systematically
increased more for families who were predicted to receive a greater boost in EITC payments during
years when the schedule expanded.
Our approach requires inclusion of a flexible function of lagged pre-tax income as detailed in
equation (4). We explored different ordered polynomials and found the estimates to be very similar
for orders four and above if we also include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income. To
be conservative, we use a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator for
positive lagged pre-tax income as our baseline ‘control function’. Our baseline specification allows
for differential growth in achievement based on a child’s gender, age, number of siblings, and
race. Below, we show that the results are similar for specifications with additional controls (i.e.
other factors affecting growth in test scores) and with more general control functions that interact
included regressors with the polynomial in income.
Table 3 reports baseline IV estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure, as
well as each of the individual PIAT subject test measures. The results in column (i) imply that a
$1,000 increase in family income raises math-reading achievement by 6% of a standard deviation,
a modest effect, but much larger than the comparable OLS estimates in column (i) of Table 2.22
21Estimating a specification analogous to column (i) in Panel A of Table 2, we find that a $1,000 increase in average
income (averaged over all available years in our data) raises math-reading achievement by 0.008 (s.e.=0.002).
22Since we use two-year differences in income and child outcomes, these estimates reflect the effects of increasing
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To place this estimate in perspective, in the OLS levels specification, having a mother who is
a high school graduate (versus a high school dropout) is associated with an increase of 17% of a
standard deviation in achievement. Looking at columns (ii) – (iv) in Table 3, the estimated effects of
income are noticeably lower for reading recognition, while the estimated effects of income on reading
comprehension and math are similar to the effects for our combined math-reading measure.
This table also reports the coefficient on our instrument in the first stage regression of changes
in total family income on changes in predicted EITC receipt. It is slightly larger than one, but not
significantly so. In general, this coefficient may deviate from one due to labor supply responses to
the EITC expansions or due to measurement error in income. As we discuss later in the paper, we
find some evidence of a modest effect operating through labor supply.
The key assumption in our analysis is that the relationship between child achievement growth
and lagged pre-tax income should be relatively stable over time if the EITC schedule is not changing.
Identification relies on linking changes in the income – achievement relationship with changes in
the EITC schedule over time. Of particular concern are systematic economic or policy changes that
would improve the test scores of children from lower-income families at the same time the EITC
expanded (most notably from 1993 to 1995). In this case, our IV estimators would mistakenly
attribute the achievement gains of disadvantaged children to the increased income their families
received from expansions of the EITC. We explore specifications in Table 4 that take into account
national time trends and changes in state-level school accountability and welfare policies. To
conserve space, we only report estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure.
The first specification in Table 4 includes year dummies in our baseline specification. This allows
average test scores to vary freely from year to year, and forces identification of our IV estimate
to come entirely from differences in predicted EITC changes across individuals (by lagged pre-tax
income) between any two years.23 This yields a similar point estimate (significant at the 0.10 level)
to that of Table 3, but the standard error increases by two-thirds. Specifications B and C in the
table allow for a linear time trend in test score growth; specification C also interacts the time trend
with the control function Φ(Pi,a−1) (i.e. the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator
for positive lagged pre-tax income). These specifications yield larger (and less precise) estimates
annual income by $1,000 for up to two years. As we show below with dynamic achievement specifications, these
estimates largely identify the impact of increasing income in the current year by $1,000, since earlier increases in
income appear to have small lasting effects. The estimates could also be inflated by about 15-20% to account for the
fact that EITC take-up rates are estimated to range from 80 to 87% (IRS 2002, Scholz 1994).
23Without time dummies, our estimates are identified even if everyone experienced the same predicted EITC change
between years as long as the EITC expanded more in some years than others. More generally, our IV specifications
that do not include time dummies are identified from changes in average EITC income and test scores over time as
well as differential changes in EITC income and test scores across individuals between particular time periods.
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when compared with our baseline estimate in Table 3. By interacting the time trend with the
control function, we address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and pre-tax
income is changing over time.
The next two specifications in Table 4 address changes in state policies that might directly affect
the relationship between child outcomes and family income or characteristics: school accountability
policies and welfare regulations. A few states began to introduce student testing/accountability
measures and welfare reforms in the early 1990s, which some studies have linked to improvements
in state test scores (e.g. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and Miller and Zhang (2008)).24 To
account for these reforms, we start by adding an annual indicator for whether the child’s state has a
‘consequential’ accountability policy (i.e. required testing with consequences for school performance)
to our baseline specification.25 The next specification examines whether accounting for welfare
reforms taking place in the 1990s (associated with statewide AFDC waivers and TANF) affects our
results. We include in our baseline specification an annual indicator equal to one if a state has any
of the following: (a) time limits on welfare receipt, (b) sanctions for violating work requirements, or
(c) school requirements for dependent children. As Table 4 shows, these additions have little affect
on our estimates. Finally, the last specification of Table 4 simultaneously accounts for national
time trends, state-level school accountability, and state-welfare reforms. The results are nearly
identical to our baseline estimates (with larger standard errors). In summary, we find no evidence
that time-varying policies or economic changes materially affect the estimated impacts of family
income on child achievement.
In Table 5, we return to dynamic models of child achievement that allow for lasting effects
of family income on children. We report estimates for the combined math-reading achievement
measure analogous to those of Table 2. Due to the limited number of major changes in the EITC
schedule, we only estimate the effects of income lasting up to two years into the future. Columns (i)
and (ii) allow for the possibility that income affects test scores up to one or two years later. Both
specifications suggest sizeable effects of contemporaneous income and effects of past income which
are smaller. Given the sizeable standard errors when multiple years of income are included, column
(iii) restricts both one- and two-year lagged income to have the same effect (i.e. δ1 = δ2). This
specification provides more precise estimates, but yields the same conclusion: contemporaneous
24Most states did not introduce school accountability policies or welfare reforms prior to 1996. A number of
states received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waivers in the early 1990s; however, most states
introduced welfare reforms with the introduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
in 1996. See Appendix C for a detailed description of our school accountability and welfare policy measures.
25These specifications also include an interaction of the accountability measure with the control function Φ(Pi,a−1).
We do the same for welfare policy indicators below.
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income plays an important role in achievement, with smaller effects from past income.26 The table
also reports the implied medium-term effects of a sustained increase in income for up to three
years. These medium-term effects are up to 50% larger than the contemporaneous effect estimated
in Table 3.
We draw two main conclusions from Table 5. First, there are small, but statistically insignificant,
effects of lagged income on math and reading achievement scores. The medium-term effects suggest
that our baseline estimates in Table 3, if anything, understate the effects of lasting income changes
on child achievement. Second, income appears to have important contemporaneous effects on child
achievement. Moreover, incorporating lasting effects of income does not substantially alter the fact
that income has a sizeable contemporaneous effect. So, while one would certainly like to more
fully determine the dynamic effects of family income on achievement, the simple ‘contemporaneous
effects’ model appears to provide reasonably good estimates of the short-run effects of income. We
focus on this baseline model in the remaining two tables.
Table 6 displays estimates from separate regressions for various population subgroups. Esti-
mates in the table reflect the impact of a $1,000 increase in current income on combined math and
reading achievement for the reported subgroups. The extent to which different subgroups are more
or less affected by changes in the EITC is reflected in the ‘Percent in EITC Range’ for each group.
Higher socioeconomic status (SES) groups have a lower probability of being affected by the EITC
and, therefore, a smaller instrumented change in income on average. This is reflected in the fact
that the first stage estimates for high SES groups typically have standard errors that are twice as
large as those for low SES groups.
Except for the final two columns, the table is organized such that estimates for more economi-
cally disadvantaged groups are reported at the top while estimates for more advantaged groups are
at the bottom. Achievement for children with low educated mothers increases significantly with
income, while achievement for children whose mothers attended at least some college is largely un-
responsive to income changes. One should exercise caution in interpreting the latter, however, since
the first stage is quite weak for children with more educated mothers. Changes in EITC schedules
do not provide a very good source of income variation for these families. We also estimate strong
and statistically significant effects of family income on the achievement of minority children; in
contrast, our estimates for whites are substantially smaller and the first stage is imprecise. Point
estimates also suggest that income raises test scores more among children in unmarried households
26A number of recent studies estimate similarly strong fade-out effects for the ‘value added’ of individual teachers
on student test scores (e.g. Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
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relative to married households, and more for children whose mother’s AFQT score is below the me-
dian compared to above the median; however, these estimates are fairly imprecise. Overall, these
estimates suggest that the effects of family income are greater for more disadvantaged children;
although, the difference is only statistically significant by maternal education.
A number of recent studies (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy
and Duncan 1999) suggest that income at early ages may have greater effects on development than
income received at later ages. In the second to last column of Table 6, we estimate the effects of
income separately for children age 11 or younger versus age 12 or older. These estimates suggest
slightly larger effects of income on achievement for younger children, although the difference is not
statistically significant. Unfortunately, we are unable to examine the effects of income at very early
ages, which is when many researchers find the largest effects. This is because the majority of our
sample (92% of the children) are age 8 through 14 when they take the PIAT tests.27
In the final column of Table 6, we estimate separate models for boys versus girls. The effect of
income for boys is twice as large as that for girls, although the standard errors are large enough
that the difference is not statistically significant. This result is similar to that found by Milligan
and Stabile (2009), who find that increased child benefit levels in Canada had stronger effects on
the academic performance of boys compared to girls.
Table 7 presents several additional specifications for the ‘contemporaneous effects’ model (com-
bined math-reading measure) to explore the robustness of our baseline results. Specification A in-
cludes additional control variables such as the mother’s age and education, her family background,
and her spouse’s characteristics in the differenced child outcome equation, while specification B
removes all control variables (except the control function) from our baseline specification. Neither
change in control variables has much impact on the estimated effect of family income. We next
explore a more general control function in specification C, interacting all of the baseline control
variables with lagged pre-tax income and the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. These interac-
tions address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and lagged income differs
based on the baseline controls. This more general control function does not appreciably change the
estimate.
Our estimates exploit variation in both state and federal EITC schedules when constructing
27Children do not take the PIAT tests in the NLSY until age five. The PIAT tests were initially administered to
children as old as 18, but this was capped at age 14 in 1994. Moreover, the PIAT reading recognition component
initially had problems which invalidated the test scores of many young children. Using the average of the math and
reading recognition tests (excluding reading recognition) as the dependent variable so as to broaden the sample to
include more young children yields a similar pattern by age: the estimated effect of income is 0.062 (s.e.=0.032) for
children age 11 or younger and 0.033 (s.e.=0.022) for children age 12 or older.
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our instruments. Specification D shows that the inclusion of state fixed effects in our specifications
has little impact on the coefficient of interest. This is true regardless of whether we use the state
EITCs to construct our instruments. Because few states had EITC provisions during our sample
period (5 states by 1996 and 10 states by 1999), the results are very similar when only using federal
changes in EITC schedules to construct our instruments.
Specification E in Table 7 uses NLSY-created weights for the initial sample of mothers to weight
observations. These estimates indicate a slightly smaller effect of family income on achievement;
however, the standard error is 12% larger than that of our baseline estimates without weights.28
Table 6 suggests that the effects of income may be stronger for more disadvantaged children.
Under this assumption, some researchers have preferred to measure income in logs rather than
levels. For comparison and as a check on the robustness of our findings, specification F of Table 7
uses log total family income as the right-hand side variable rather than income measured in levels.29
This specification implies that a 10% increase in family income raises achievement by 6.4% of a
standard deviation. For families with income of $12,000, an extra $1,000 would raise child math-
reading scores by 0.053 of a standard deviation, similar to our baseline IV estimate that uses income
measured in levels.
It is natural to question whether the large changes in the EITC generated important labor supply
responses among mothers which may have affected children separately from the direct effects of
income we aim to measure.30 If so, our strategy will attribute these additional effects to income
unless we also control for parental labor supply. Most empirical studies find very small negative
effects of the EITC expansions on hours worked by women who were already working. The literature
28Two arguments are often made for using sampling weights. First, they can produce more efficient estimates.
However, this is not generally true in the case of IV estimation and does not appear to be true in our application
based on a comparison of standard errors. A second argument sometimes made for using sampling weights is based on
heterogeneous ‘treatment effects’ and the desire for estimating a population average effect. Since blacks and hispanics
are over-represented in our sample, one might want to use sampling weights to obtain a population ‘average’ effect
of family income on achievement. However, it is well-known that IV does not generally yield a population average
effect, except in rare cases (see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 1998, Imbens and Angrist 1994, Wooldridge 1997). In
our context, regardless of whether we use sampling weights, IV estimates a weighted average of income effects for
blacks, hispanics, and whites; however, this weighted average is unlikely to reflect the true population average effect.
Estimates using the sampling weights should place a larger weight on the effect for whites vs. minorities. Thus, the
slightly smaller estimate for specification D relative to our baseline estimate in Table 3 is consistent with the finding
in Table 6 that income effects are larger for minorities than for whites.
29In this specification, we use ln
(
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1] + χsi,a−1a
(
Eˆ[Pi,a|Pi,a−1]
))
− ln(Pi,a−1 − χsi,a−1a−1 (Pi,a−1)) as an
instrument for ∆ln(Iia).
30In principle, an EITC expansion may affect children in three ways. First, holding earnings constant, it increases
family income. Second, it may affect earnings through family labor supply responses. Both of these affect children
through available family resources. Finally, labor supply responses may directly affect children through parental time
spent with children. If labor supply responses to EITC schedule changes are small, the second and third effects will
be negligible, and we identify only the first effect. More generally, in controlling for labor supply, we identify the sum
of the first two effects (i.e. the effect of the total change in income).
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also finds a positive effect on labor market participation among single mothers, but small negative
effects on married mothers with working husbands (see Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa and Hoynes
2005). Specification G of Table 7 adds changes in maternal labor force participation and hours
worked to our baseline specifications as additional controls. An increase in the number of hours
a mother works has small negative estimated effects on children, whereas participation changes
have statistically insignificant effects. Most importantly, accounting for changes in mother’s labor
market participation and hours of work does not affect our main conclusion about the importance
of family income.31
Recall that total income increased by $1.27 for a $1 increase in predicted EITC payments in
the first stage of the baseline specification. The fact that the coefficient is slightly larger than one
(although not significantly so) is consistent with a modest bonus impact through increased labor
supply. Indeed, once labor supply is controlled for in panel G, the first stage coefficient drops to
0.90.
5.3 Interpreting IV Estimates
Our IV results indicate modest but encouraging effects of family income on children’s scholastic
achievement. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined math
and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Although modest in an absolute sense,
our estimates are large relative to much of the literature and relative to the OLS and differenced
estimates reported in Table 2. Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2007) also report IV estimates of
the effect of family income on child achievement that are much larger than their OLS estimates.
Their IV strategy exploits randomly assigned variation in family income supplements from ten
different income support and welfare experiments to identify the causal effect of income. Looking
at expansions in the Canadian child benefit program, Milligan and Stabile (2009) find even larger
effects of extra income on children’s test scores than we do. Like our approach, these two papers
use exogenous variation in income and focus on relatively disadvantaged families.
We speculate that a variety of factors may be responsible for our larger IV estimates relative to
traditional OLS and fixed effects or differenced estimates. A first possibility is that measurement
31The endogeneity of which mothers work and how much they choose to work is an obvious concern. We attempted
to treat participation as endogenous by using changing parameters of the EITC schedules (e.g. maximum credit
amounts, phase-in and phase-out rates) over time as additional instrumental variables for maternal labor market
participation (an approach similar in spirit to Blundell, et. al 1998, and Eissa and Hoynes 2006). This approach
yields statistically significant estimates for family income that are very similar to our baseline estimates; however, it
produces imprecise estimates for maternal labor force participation. Unfortunately, the first stage for maternal labor
supply indicates the instruments are weak in our sample.
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error produces attenuation bias for standard methods. Fixed effects and differenced estimators are
particularly affected by this problem, since changes in income are noisier than income measured in
levels. However, measurement error alone is unlikely to explain most of the gap between our IV
estimates and more traditional estimates. As reported in Section 5.1, the estimated effect of average
income (which should have less measurement error) is 70% larger compared to the estimated effect
of contemporaneous income in OLS specifications (0.0080 versus 0.0047) but still much smaller
than our IV estimates.
A second potential explanation is that income matters more for disadvantaged families and that
our IV estimates capture the effects of income for disadvantaged families who are affected by the
EITC expansions. Table 6 offers some support for this explanation. Furthermore, Løken, Mogstad
and Wiswall (2010) argue that nonlinear effects explain why OLS and FE estimators find little
evidence that family income matters, since these estimates place relatively little weight on poor
families in most studies. To further explore this issue, we split the sample into low, middle, and
high average total family income groups and use OLS to estimate separate effects of income for
each group.32 The effect of a $1,000 increase in average income is 0.026 (s.e.=0.009) for the bottom
quartile, 0.010 (0.004) for the middle two quartiles combined, and 0.010 (0.004) for the highest
quartile. The effect for the lowest income group is much larger than the effects for higher income
groups and closer to our IV estimates.
A third explanation recognizes that each EITC expansion effectively raised the annual incomes
of eligible families for many years in the future. For example, we estimate that for the median EITC
recipient, the 1993-95 EITC expansion raised total credit amounts over the years 1995-99 by nearly
four times the amount it raised credit amounts in 1995 alone.33 If families are forward-looking
and base their investment decisions on current and expected future income, we would expect them
to respond more to a lasting change in income than to a one-year change. A lasting increase in
income is also likely to alleviate family stress and improve family dynamics more than a comparable
32Given the NLSY oversampling of minorities and poor whites, our data contains a large number of low and
moderate income families. The lowest quartile corresponds to families earning less than $18,031 on average, the
middle two quartiles between $18,031 and $41,790, and the fourth quartile greater than $41,790. We use average
income rather than current income to minimize problems with measurement error and to capture more permanent
differences in income.
33To empirically investigate the persistence of EITC gains for families, we divide the cumulative three-year credit in-
crease (for 1995, 1997, and 1999) by the one-year credit increase for 1995 resulting from the large EITC expansion that
took place between 1993 and 1995. Specifically, we calculate [χ95(P95)+χ95(P97)+χ95(P99)]−[χ93(P95)+χ93(P97)+χ93(P99)]
χ95(P95)−χ93(P95) ,
where χs(Pt) reflects the simulated EITC credit based on the schedule from year s and pre-tax income reported for
year t. The median of this ratio (for those who received any EITC in 1995) is 2.33, while the 25th and 75th percentiles
of this ratio are 1.51 and 3.12, respectively. Extrapolating based on the median ratio implies that a $1 increase in
current EITC income translates into a $3.88 increase in EITC income over the next five years.
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temporary increase. In this case, our IV estimator identifies the effect of increasing annual income
by $1,000 for many years into the future and not just a single year. On the other hand, OLS and
difference estimators identify the effect of a much more short-lived increase in income, since most
of the underlying variation in income over time is transitory (or measurement error).34 Thus, it is
not surprising that our IV estimates exceed our OLS and difference estimators.
A final possible explanation for larger IV estimates may have to do with the nature of EITC
income relative to other income sources. Three features of the EITC are somewhat special. First,
the EITC is typically paid out in lump sum fashion after families file their taxes (many EITC
recipients even receive an automatic refund at filing), and families may spend these lump-sum
transfers differently than they spend more traditional income flows (Barrow and McGranahan
(2000) and Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008)). Second, since EITC payments explicitly
depend on having children in the household, families may feel some obligation to spend it on
their children. Third, EITC payments come in the mail with tax returns or are direct deposited
into family accounts. As such, mothers may be more likely to gain control of EITC payments than
fathers (compared to other sources of income). A number of studies empirically find that household
expenditures on children increase with the share of family income going to mothers (e.g. Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, and Ward-Batts 2008).
6 Conclusion
Understanding the consequences of growing up poor for a child’s well-being is an important research
question, but one that is difficult to answer due to the potential endogeneity of family income. The
question is particularly interesting to policymakers, since part of the explicit rationale for income
support programs (such as the EITC) is to improve the lot of children. Past estimates of the effect
of family income on child development have often been plagued by omitted variable bias. That is,
children growing up in poor families are likely to have home environments or face other challenges
which would continue to affect development even if family income rose substantially.
In this paper, we use an IV strategy to estimate the causal effect of income on children’s math
and reading achievement. Using a panel of 4,412 children matched to their mothers allows us to
address problems associated with both unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous transitory income
shocks. Our IV approach exploits the large non-linear changes in the EITC in the late 1980s and
1990s as an exogenous source of variation in family income levels. The largest of these EITC
34See Dahl and Lochner (2005) for a more formal discussion of these issues.
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changes doubled benefit amounts for some families between 1993 and 1997, accounting for as much
as $2,100 in extra income (measured in year 2000$). Over the time period in our sample, the EITC
expansions raised average family income by more than 10% for EITC eligible families with two or
more children.
We find that extra family income has a modest, but encouraging, causal effect for children
growing up in poor families. Our IV results indicate that current income has significant effects
on a child’s math and reading test scores. The baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in
income raises contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Over
the entire sample period (1987–1999), the median EITC payment for eligible two-child families
increased by $1,670 (in year 2000$), implying an average test score increase of 10% of a standard
deviation for this group.
Our estimates also suggest that the effects are larger for children growing up in more disad-
vantaged families, younger children, and boys. The results are robust to a variety of alternative
specifications, including regressions which account for time-varying state policies, general control
functions, and maternal labor market participation. Simple dynamic models suggest that contem-
poraneous income has the largest effect on achievement, with small effects from past income. An
interesting avenue for future research would be to explore why income has modest contemporaneous
effects but small long-run effects on achievement.
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Appendix A: Methodological Issues
Details on EITC, Tax, and Net Total Income Measures
We create three family income categories based on the many income components in the NLSY:
earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. Earned income includes income from
wages and salary. Unearned income includes reported income from a business or farm, unemploy-
ment compensation, and a residual catch-all question referring to interest income, social security
payments, net rental income, and income from other regular sources. Non-taxable income includes
income from veteran benefits, worker compensation or disability payments, welfare payments (in-
cluding food stamps, Supplementary Security Income, or other public assistance), and child support.
All of these measures include income received by the mother as well as her spouse. (Income from
unmarried partners is not included.)
To calculate actual EITC and tax amounts, we use both earned and unearned income, running
them through TAXSIM for the appropriate year.35 These are added (EITC) to and subtracted
(taxes) from pre-tax/EITC income to create our measure of total net family income, Iia.
To calculate predicted EITC amounts for use in our instruments, we only input earned in-
come (or predicted earned income) into TAXSIM. We do this because unearned income amounts
are generally quite low (and noisy) for persons otherwise qualifying for the EITC, and including
unearned income would require the inclusion of a more complicated control function used in IV
that depended on both earned and unearned income. The analysis is greatly simplified by leaving
unearned income out, with little sacrificed in terms of identifying power.
IV Estimation of the Contemporaneous Effects Model
To understand the implicit assumptions underlying our IV strategy, begin by assuming that α =
β = 0 in equation (3). In this case, IV will provide consistent estimates if
Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1,∆χIVa ] = Φ(Pi,a−1).
The a subscript on the expectation on the left reflects that it is taken with respect to the age a
conditional distribution of ∆εia. The key assumptions underlying this approach are (i) the control
function Φ(·) is flexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child development
shocks and pre-tax income, and (ii) the stability of that relationship over time.
First, notice that Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1,∆χIVa (Pi,a−1)] = Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1] if factors affecting the EITC
schedule, sia, do not affect the relationship between shocks to child outcomes and pre-tax income. If
everyone was on the same schedule, this would be trivially satisfied since ∆χIVa would only be a func-
tion of pre-tax income. Endogeneity problems can be traced to the relationship between ∆εia and
35We put all unearned income through TAXSIM as ‘unemployment income’ since the program treats it as fully
taxable income during our sample period, but it appropriately does not treat it as earned income in computing the
EITC. While in later years persons with ‘excessive’ interest and dividend income (above $2,200-2,500 depending on
the year) should be disqualified from the EITC, we are unable to separate this source of income from social security
payments, rental income or other regular sources of income. By including this income with other unearned income
and putting it through TAXSIM as ‘unemployment income’, we effectively ignore this feature of the EITC rules.
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(Pi,a−1, Pia). Stability of this relationship over time (i.e. Ea(∆εia|Pi,a−1, Pia) = E(∆εia|Pi,a−1, Pia)
so the expectation no longer depends on age, a) and stationarity of the income evolution pro-
cess (i.e. the joint distribution g(Pi,a−1, Pia) = g(Pi,a′−1, Pia′) for all a, a′) further implies that
Ea[∆εia|Pi,a−1] = E[∆εia|Pi,a−1] = Φ(Pi,a−1) for a sufficiently flexible function Φ(·). Note there is
nothing inherently special regarding the use of lagged pre-tax income in this approach; one could
reverse the roles played by current and lagged pre-tax income and include a flexible function of
current income as the control function.
More generally, when α and β are not zero, one can incorporate xi and ∆wia into the control
function. The estimates would then be consistent if
Ea[∆εia|xi,∆wia, Pi,a−1,∆χSIVa ] = Φ(xi,∆wia, Pi,a−1).
Estimating such a general control function can be empirically difficult due to the curse of dimension-
ality. Most of our regressors are indicator variables. In practice, we explore control functions with
high order polynomials in Pi,a−1 and interactions of those polynomials with all of our regressors.
In general, the inclusion of interaction terms has negligible effects on estimates of our parameters
of interest, and the simpler Φ(Pi,a−1) is sufficient.
IV Estimation of Models with Lasting Income Effects
Estimating more general first-difference models with lagged changes in income like equation (2) re-
quires additional instruments for each new income term. We use instruments analogous to those de-
scribed above. For example, when we estimate equation (2) using IV, we use χsi,a−1a−` (Eˆ[Pi,a−`|Pi,a−1])−
χ
si,a−1
a−`−1(Eˆ[Pi,a−`−1|Pi,a−1]) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−`.36 It is still necessary to include the control
function Φ(Pi,a−1), and the assumptions discussed above must still be satisfied.
Estimating Equations using Two-Year Differences
Our data only contain measures of child outcomes every other year; however, our model of child
outcomes (equation (1)) is based on annual income. We assume (1) describes child outcomes;
however, we estimate our models using two-period differences. If we define ∆2 to be the two-period
difference operator (e.g. ∆2yia = yia − yi,a−2), then our model implies:
∆2yia = x′iα+∆2w
′
iaβ +∆2Iiaδ0 +∆2Ii,a−1δ1 + ...+∆2Ii,a−LδL +∆2εia. (2′)
We estimate versions of this equation for L = 0, 1, 2. While estimation of the ‘contemporaneous
effects’ model (i.e. L = 0) does not require income data for years in-between when child outcome
measures are observed, estimation of other models does.
36Notice, all simulated EITC changes are based on the schedule and pre-tax income level as of age a − 1. This
maintains tractability, since it does not require inclusion of other lagged values of pre-tax income in the con-
trol function Φ(Pi,a−1). Using different lags of pre-tax income to simulate EITC changes for each lag (e.g. using
χ
si,a−1
a−` (Eˆ[Pi,a−`|Pi,a−`−1]) − χ
si,a−1
a−`−1(Pi,a−`−1) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−`) would require including each year of
lagged pre-tax income levels (used to create the instruments) in the control function.
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Appendix B: Description of NLSY Children Data
Child Characteristics
Most child characteristics are taken directly from the Children of the NLSY survey responses in even
numbered years from 1986 to 2000. PIAT math and reading tests were administered biannually
primarily to children ages five to fourteen.37 We create normalized measures of PIAT math and
reading using the standardized scores. These scores are initially normed by the NLSY based on
a random sample of children in 1968 to have a constant mean (100) and standard deviation (15)
for each age. For interpretation purposes, we re-normalize math, reading recognition, and reading
comprehension scores by subtracting the sample mean from the NLSY random sample and then
dividing by the sample standard deviation. This produces individual test scores with a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one for the random sample of respondents. To create a combined
math-reading score, we average the normalized math and reading measures and then re-normalize
to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one (based on the random sample).
Parental Characteristics
Most parental characteristics are taken directly from the NLSY. Additionally, we create an age-
adjusted, normalized AFQT measure using the percentile scores based on the 1979 calculation. We
first create a normalized value by subtracting off the mean from the random sample and dividing
by the sample standard deviation. Then, we regress these normalized scores on age dummies and
use the residuals from this regression as our adjusted AFQT measure. We also fill in missing values
for education, marital status, and spousal age using observed values in surrounding years.
Family Income
We calculate total family income combining all available measures of income in the NLSY, deflating
them using the annual CPI-U so that they are in year 2000 dollars. Because some of the income
components are missing in one or more years, we use a detailed imputation procedure to maintain
a large representative sample. (We note, however, that imputations play little role in estimation of
our contemporaneous effects model; they are more important for models with lagged income. This
is because income is only observed every other year after 1994, and models with lagged income
require the odd-numbered years.) We begin by describing the available measures of family income
from a battery of questions that vary slightly over time; then, we discuss imputation of missing
values. Appendix A discusses details regarding the aggregation of these measures into total family
income and determining EITC and tax amounts.
We utilize reported income of the respondent (i.e., the child’s mother) and her spouse from the
following sources: (i) wages, salary and tips (including income from military service); (ii) business
37Many children ages 5-7 do not have valid scores for the reading recognition test, because their scores were out of
range based on the national norming sample in 1968. Starting in 1994, the tests were given only to children who had
not reached their 15th birthday by the end of the calendar year. Around two percent of children took the PIAT tests
after their 15th birthday before this rule was put in place. We include these children in our analysis, but the results
are very similar if they are excluded. See the NLSY79 User’s Guide for details.
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and farm income; (iii) unemployment income; (iv) income from savings, net rental income, and
social security income; (v) veteran benefits, worker compensation, and disability payments; (vi)
welfare/AFDC, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income or other public assistance; and (vii)
child support.
For all survey years (1979-1994, 1996, 1998, 2000), we impute each of these income sources
separately based on the full panel of responses for individuals. Our different imputations largely
reflect the relative importance of each income measure in computing total family income. Sources
(i)-(iii) are imputed separately for the mother and her spouse, while all other sources are combined
for both and imputed as a single measure. For wage, salary, and military income (source i), we
use an individual-specific regression of income on age and age-squared to impute missing income
observations. Only observations when an individual is age 22 or older are used in the regression,
and we only impute missing observations when at least 8 non-missing observations are available.
To impute missing observations for sources (ii) and (iv), we use individual-specific regressions of
income on age (only using observations when an individual is age 22 or older and requiring at least 6
non-missing values). To impute missing observations for all other sources, we use individual-specific
means (for ages 22 or older when at least 4 non-missing values are available). For non-survey years
1995, 1997, and 1999, we impute each income source as the average of adjacent year reports. (These
‘odd year’ imputations are only used in the dynamic specifications of Tables 2 and 5.) More detailed
notes on the imputation procedure are available from the authors upon request.
We trim the sample to exclude the approximately 1% of observations with two-year after-tax
total income changes of greater than $40,000 in absolute value (in year 2000 dollars). We note that
welfare income measures in the NLSY sometimes show implausibly large jumps across surveys.
Therefore, we further trim the 11% of observations with welfare changes exceeding $2,500 (in abso-
lute value) if there is not a corresponding change in earned income (of the opposite sign) that is at
least as large. Modest changes in these trimming rules have little effect on our estimates; however,
failure to trim at all greatly reduces the precision of our estimates. For example, trimming obser-
vations with welfare changes exceeding $4,000 (in absolute value) without a corresponding change
in earned income trims 7.5% of observations and yields similar results compared to the baseline IV
estimates: the effect of income on combined math-reading achievement is 0.066 (s.e.=.027) versus
0.061 (s.e.=.023) in Table 3.
Appendix C: State-level School Accountability and Welfare Reform
Measures
Our measures of accountability and welfare reform are taken from Appendix Table 2 of Miller
and Zhang (2008). Their accountability measures are largely due to Hanushek and Raymond
(2005), who distinguish between ‘consequential’ accountability, which attaches consequences to
school performance, and ‘report card’ accountability, which simply provides public report cards for
schools. Their data reports three states as introducing accountability in ‘1993 or earlier’. Based
on checks of State Department of Education websites, we code the introduction of accountability
in Wisconsin as 1991, North Carolina as 1993, and Connecticut as 1988. Other states that were
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early to introduce ‘consequential’ accountability include Texas (1994) and Kentucky (1995).
Miller and Zhang (2008) document the introduction of three types of welfare reforms that took
place at the state level since the early 1990s: limits on the amount of time a person (over a spell or
over one’s lifetime) can remain on welfare; sanctions (including partial or full reduction in welfare
benefits) on recipients not meeting work or schooling requirements; and schooling requirements
for children (e.g. maintaining minimum grades or requiring attendance). The following states
introduced at least one of these reforms prior to 1996: New Jersey (1992); Illinois, Iowa, and
Utah (1993); Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, South Dakota, and Vermont (1994); Arizona, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Missouri (1995).
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Figure 1a: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children (Year 2000 Dollars)
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Figure 1b: Two-Year Changes in EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children
(Year 2000 Dollars)
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Table 1. Family Income, EITC Eligibility, and EITC Payments over Time (in Year 2000 $)
Fraction of EITC Payment as a
Children Fraction of Family
in EITC Median EITC Income (if Eligible)
Number of Median Lagged Eligible Payment 1 Child 2+ Child
Year Children Family Income Families (if Eligible) Families Families
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1988 1,186 23,463 0.31 547 0.05 0.05
1990 1,186 24,791 0.35 718 0.05 0.05
1992 1,648 26,852 0.31 833 0.06 0.06
1994 1,655 28,832 0.36 1,124 0.09 0.07
1996 1,682 34,988 0.34 1,917 0.10 0.13
1998 1,349 38,179 0.34 2,031 0.10 0.14
2000 1,088 38,390 0.35 2,217 0.11 0.16
All 9,794 30,491 0.34 1,124 0.08 0.10
Notes: Data are from the Children of the NLSY linked to their mothers in the main NLSY79. The
unit of observation is a child. The sample is restricted to those used in our baseline IV analysis in
Table 3. Children must have valid math and reading PIAT scores, child control measures in panel
A of Table B1, and family income measures for the reported year. Children must also have at least
two years of valid observations to be included. Year in column (i) refers to the NLSY survey year;
income and EITC payment variables refer to the previous year’s income. Family income includes
tax payments and tax credits (including the EITC); the sources for family income include earned
income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Family Income on Math-Reading Achievement
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Estimated in Levels
Current Income 0.0047** 0.0031** 0.0022 0.0023
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0022 0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0024)
Lagged Income (t-2) 0.0015
(0.0019)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0017*
(0.0009)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0047** 0.0053** 0.0056** 0.0056**
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
B. Estimated in Differences
Current Income 0.0010 0.0015* 0.0010 0.0016*
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0005 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0011)
Lagged Income (t-2) -0.0007
(0.0009)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0001
(0.0005)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0010 0.0020* 0.0015 0.0018
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Sample Size (for both panels) 8,608 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Panel A ‘levels’ regressions (equation 1) control for all variables listed
in Appendix Table B1. Panel B ‘difference’ regressions (equation 2) use two-period differences and
control for baseline variables in Panel A of Table B1. Samples include children taking a math or
reading PIAT test in the 1988 survey year or later. ‘Medium-Term Effect’ is given by the sum of
current and all estimated lagged income coefficients in columns (i)-(iii) and the sum of the coefficient
on current income plus twice the coefficient on the sum of lagged income measures in column (iv).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at
the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 3: Baseline IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model
Combined Math Reading Reading
and Reading Recognition Comprehension Math
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Effect of Current Income 0.0610** 0.0359* 0.0613** 0.0582**
(0.0231) (0.0195) (0.0273) (0.0273)
1st Stage Coeff. on Instrument 1.270** 1.270** 1.270** 1.270**
(0.381) (0.381) (0.381) (0.381)
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1, an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fifth
order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All models are estimated in two-year differences to
account for unobserved child fixed effects. Sample size is 8,608 for all the columns. **Significant
at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 4: IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model Accounting for Time Trends and
Time-Varying State Policies (Math-Reading Achievement)
Effect of Current 1st Stage Coeff.
Income on Instrument
A. Year Dummies 0.0686* 0.745**
(0.0389) (0.348)
B. Linear Time Trend 0.0857** 0.847**
(0.0378) (0.334)
C. Linear Time Trend Interacted with Control Function 0.0806** 1.114**
(0.0399) (0.485)
D. State School Accountability Policies Interacted with 0.0533** 1.299**
Control Function (0.0221) (0.406)
E. State Welfare Policies Interacted with Control Function 0.0671** 1.312**
(0.0268) (0.436)
F. Time Trend, Accountability and Welfare Policies 0.0629* 1.192**
Interacted with Control Function (0.0339) (0.513)
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix
Table B1. All specifications are estimated in two-year differences to account for unobserved child
fixed effects. Sample size is 8,608 for all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 5: IV Estimates of Achievement Models with Lasting Income Effects
(i) (ii) (iii)
Current Income 0.0436* 0.0552 0.0515**
(0.0237) (0.0478) (0.0227)
Lagged Income (t-1) 0.0216 0.0135
(0.0408) (0.0733)
Lagged Income (t-2) 0.0207
(0.0382)
Sum of (t-1) and (t-2) Lagged Income 0.0187
(0.0255)
Medium-Term Effect of Increasing 0.0652* 0.0894 0.0889
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years (0.0349) (0.0605) (0.0598)
F-statistics from 1st Stage 6.17, 3.59 3.98, 1.39, 2.16 5.53, 1.76
Sample Size 6,543 5,019 5,019
Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured in
$1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1,
an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a fifth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All
models are estimated in two-year differences to account for unobserved child fixed effects. ‘Medium-Term
Effect’ is given by the sum of current and all estimated lagged income coefficients in columns (i) and (ii)
and the sum of the coefficient on current income plus twice the coefficient on the sum of lagged income
measures in column (iii). F-statistics are for tests that all instruments equal zero in first-stage equations.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5%
level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 6. IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model for Various Subgroups
Mother’s
Mother’s Marital Mother’s Child’s Child’s
Education Race Status AFQT Age Gender
High School Black or Not Low Age
or Less Hispanic Married AFQT < 12 Male
Effect of Current Income 0.0536** 0.0800** 0.0807* 0.0709** 0.0764* 0.0879**
(0.0211) (0.0304) (0.0463) (0.0340) (0.0436) (0.0446)
1st Stage Coeff. 1.387** 1.282** 0.808** 1.089** 1.051** 1.056**
on Instrument (0.402) (0.428) (0.389) (0.433) (0.495) (0.472)
‘Percent in EITC Range’ 56.4 62.8 90.1 64.9 46.4 49.6
Sample Size 6,252 4,602 2,977 4,310 4,654 4,261
Some College White High Age
or More (not Hisp.) Married AFQT ≥ 12 Female
Effect of Current Income 0.0000 0.0145 0.0432* 0.0486 0.0515** 0.0399*
(0.0117) (0.0295) (0.0247) (0.0361) (0.0235) (0.0221)
1st Stage Coeff. 0.086 1.264 2.154** 1.466* 1.459** 1.479**
on Instrument (1.123) (0.798) (0.907) (0.802) (0.452) (0.489)
‘Percent in EITC Range’ 30.8 34.1 28.0 33.3 53.0 49.3
Sample Size 2,356 4,006 5,631 4,040 3,954 4,347
Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All specifications control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table B1 and are estimated in two-year differences to account for
unobserved child fixed effects. ‘Percent in EITC Range’ is calculated as the fraction with lagged
pre-tax income less than or equal to $30,000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
Table 7: Robustness of IV Estimates for ‘Contemporaneous Effects’ Model
Effect on 1st Stage Coefficient
Child Achievement on Instrument
A. Additional Control Variables
Effect of Current Income 0.0792** 0.934**
(0.0392) (0.404)
B. No Control Variables (Except Control Function, i.e., Polynomial in Lagged Earnings)
Effect of Current Income 0.0657** 1.318**
(0.0231) (0.380)
C. Interact Control Function with Baseline Regressors
Effect of Current Income 0.0617** 1.282**
(0.0232) (0.387)
D. Include State Dummies with Baseline Regressors
Effect of Current Income 0.0646** 1.186**
(0.0258) (0.387)
E. Use NLSY-supplied Weights
Effect of Current Income 0.0508** 1.240**
(0.0259) (0.477)
F. Log Family Income Measure
Effect of Log Current Income 0.6393** 1.210**
(0.2170) (0.298)
G. Controls for Mother’s Labor Market Participation and Work Hours
Effect of Current Income 0.0841** 0.901**
(0.0402) (0.371)
Effect of Mother’s Participation -0.007
(0.046)
Effect of Mother’s Work Hours (in 100’s) -0.026**
(0.012)
Notes: Specifications identical to those for ‘Combined Math and Reading’ in Table 3 with the noted excep-
tions. Specification A controls for all variables in Appendix Table B1 and state school accountability and
welfare policies (in addition to the control function in lagged pre-tax income). Specification B controls only
for the control function. Specification C interacts the control function with all baseline regressors. Specifi-
cation D includes state indicators along with all baseline regressors. Specification E uses the NLSY-supplied
weights for mothers (includes baseline controls and control function). Specification F uses log family income
rather than income measured in levels (includes baseline controls and control function). Specification G con-
trols for mother’s labor market participation and hours worked in addition to baseline regressors and control
function. Sample sizes are 8,608 for Specifications A–F and 8,238 for Specification G. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Significant at the 5% level, *significant at
the 10% level.
Table B1: Sample Characteristics for Children, their Mothers, and their Families
Entire Eligible Not Eligible Difference
Sample for EITC for EITC (ii)-(iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
A. Baseline Variables
male 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.00
age 11.00 11.23 10.88 0.35**
no siblings 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.05**
one sibling 0.39 0.35 0.42 -0.07**
two or more siblings 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
black 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.19**
hispanic 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.01
B. Additional Variables
mother’s age 33.45 33.25 33.54 -0.29**
mother a high school dropout 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.11**
mother a high school graduate 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.01
mother attended some college 0.20 0.17 0.22 -0.05**
mother graduated college 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.07**
mother’s AFQT score (normalized & age adjusted) -0.47 -0.77 -0.31 -0.45**
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.64 0.57 0.68 -0.11**
mother’s father present in household 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03**
mother’s mother present in household 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05**
number of adults in household 1.86 1.67 1.96 -0.29**
highest grade completed by mother’s father 8.42 7.34 8.97 -1.62**
highest grade completed by mother’s mother 9.65 8.93 10.02 -1.09**
mother married last year 0.65 0.37 0.79 -0.41**
age of mother’s spouse 35.39 35.28 35.42 -0.14
mother’s spouse a high school dropout 0.17 0.31 0.13 0.18**
mother’s spouse a high school graduate 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.02
mother’s spouse attended some college 0.20 0.14 0.21 -0.07**
mother’s spouse a college graduate 0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.14**
year 1993 1993 1993 0.13
missing observation indicators:
mother’s AFQT score 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01*
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00*
mother’s father present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother’s mother present in household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of adults in household missing 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
highest grade completed by mother’s father 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03**
highest grade completed by mother’s mother 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
age of mother’s spouse 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mother’s spouse’s education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of child-year observations 9,794 3,305 6,489
number of children 4,412 2,035 3,236
Notes: Unit of observation is a child-year, where children and parents can appear repeatedly in the sample.
The sample is restricted to observations used in our IV analysis: children must have valid math and reading
PIAT scores, child control measures (in panel A), and family income measures in a year to be included.
Children must also have at least two years of valid observations to be included. Race of the child is based
on the reported race of the mother. Mother’s education variables represent completed education when
the mother is age 23. Average spousal education and age are reported for the sample of married mothers
(sample sizes are 6,332, 1,233 and 5,099 for columns (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively). In column (iv), **
denotes statistical significance at 5% level, and * denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
